New English Review " />
Please Help New English Review
For our donors from the UK:
New English Review
New English Review Facebook Group
Follow New English Review On Twitter
Recent Publications by New English Review Authors
The Literary Culture of France
by J. E. G. Dixon
Hamlet Made Simple and Other Essays
by David P. Gontar
Farewell Fear
by Theodore Dalrymple
The Eagle and The Bible: Lessons in Liberty from Holy Writ
by Kenneth Hanson
The West Speaks
interviews by Jerry Gordon
Mohammed and Charlemagne Revisited: The History of a Controversy
Emmet Scott
Why the West is Best: A Muslim Apostate's Defense of Liberal Democracy
Ibn Warraq
Anything Goes
by Theodore Dalrymple
Karimi Hotel
De Nidra Poller
The Left is Seldom Right
by Norman Berdichevsky
Allah is Dead: Why Islam is Not a Religion
by Rebecca Bynum
Virgins? What Virgins?: And Other Essays
by Ibn Warraq
An Introduction to Danish Culture
by Norman Berdichevsky
The New Vichy Syndrome:
by Theodore Dalrymple
Jihad and Genocide
by Richard L. Rubenstein
Second Opinion
by Theodore Dalrymple
Not With a Bang But a Whimper: The Politics and Culture of Decline
by Theodore Dalrymple
In Praise of Prejudice: The Necessity of Preconceived Ideas
by Theodore Dalrymple
Defending The West:
by Ibn Warraq
Nations, Language and Citizenship:
by Norman Berdichevsky
Romancing Opiates
by Theodore Dalrymple
Which Koran?
by Ibn Warraq
Our Culture, What's Left of It
by Theodore Dalrymple
What The Koran Really Says
by Ibn Warraq
Life at the Bottom
by Theodore Dalrymple
The Origins of the Koran
by Ibn Warraq
Why I Am Not Muslim
by Ibn Warraq
Spanish Vignettes: An Offbeat Look Into Spain's Culture, Society & History
by Norman Berdichevsky
Leaving Islam
Edited by Ibn Warraq
The Danish-German Border Dispute, 1815-2001: Aspects of Cultural and Demographic Politics
by Norman Berdichevsky
What's Love Got to Do with It?: Emotions and Relationships in Pop Songs
by Thomas J. Scheff





Tuesday, 12 June 2012

A "Grand Bargain" With Iran

General Firouzabadi, who is the chief of the Iranian General Staff, has been warning the West about helping the Uber-Sunnis of Al-Qaeda in Syria and Lebanon. That's not surprising; Iran doesn't want to lose regimes that are allied to, or cowed by, it. But there is something else going on. For thirty years the Islamic Republic of Iran has seen itself as not only the inspiration for the world's Musilms, but the obvious head of the world's Muslims. It has been learning, to its great chagrin, that not even taking the lead, and doing its utmost, to wipe out Israel --- though no doubt if this were to occur screams of pleasure would go up all over Muslim lands -- will cause Iran to be seen as a leader. For the Iranians are Shi'a, despised by the Sunnis who, in whatever lands there is a large enough Shi'a population to matter, but small enough not itself to rule, as it does in Iran -- there the Sunnis disenfranchise, or do not share the national wealth with, or suppress by state power and by the informal application of force by Sunni terrorists and even those Sunnis who just want to have a good time attacking Shi'a (as happens in Pakistan, as a sport and a pastime). The late Al-Zarqawi and those who followed him used to rant about the Shi'a in Iraq as "Rafidite dogs," and it is clear that the Sunnis will never accept their loss of power, and therefore of money, to the Shi'a in Iraq, even though Shi'a Arabs outnumber Sunni Arabs by more than three to one.

Outside Iraq, the Shi'a institutions, and individual Shi'a -- are attacked, and blown up by Sunni terrorist groups such as Sipah-e-Sahaba in Pakistan, kept down by systematic formal and informal persecution in the Eastern Province -- the oil-bearing region --of Saudi Arabia, subdued by force in Yemen when they try to obtain more autonomy, treated with contumely by the  Sunnis, always better off than the despised Shi'a, in Lebanon, suppressed by force in Bahrain, prevented from obtaining political power equal to their numbers in Kuwait.

Not everyone in Iran, even in government circles, is a fool. Not everyone can remain permanently unaware that the Shi'a can't possibly hope to become the "leader" of Sunni Muslims, and some Shi'a may now be wondering if they face, not only in Syria, but elsewhere, a determined Sunni effort, that will not end, to push the Shi'a down, to reduce their influence, their power, their revenues, their numbers, their everything. 

It may be time at least to consider what, using that phrase beloved of so many, might constitute a "Grand Bargain" with Shi'a Iran.

To wit:

1. The Western world demands assurances from the Syrian regime that it will cease to support Hezbollah in Lebanon, and will no longer concern itself with Lebanon at all. The Iranians must agree rather than oppose this.

2.. The Western world stops putting pressure on the Syrian regime and does nothing to keep it from suppressing the Sunni Arabs who threaten it. That means the war inside Syria goes on forever, as the Sunni opposition continues to weaken the regime but never manage to topple it. The Alawites are forced to concentrate on staying in power with Christian, Druze, Kurdish, and some Sunni support, but have no ability to meddle outside Syria's borders.

3, The Western world -- that is, the United States -- promises that if Iran gives up its nuclear project, the American government will do nothing to damage the conventional military capabilities of Iran, and secretly gives assurances that it understands that Iran has to remain sufficiently strong to protect itself against the Sunni menace, which is also recognized as a grave threat to the West.

4. In addition, the Americans undertake to prevent Sunni Muslims --the Taliban, for example -- from renewing their campaign to wipe out the Shi'a Hazara in Afghanistan.

5. In the Persian Gulf, the Americans will do nothing to oppose or prevent Iran from making its claims to certain islands in the Gulf, and to Bahrain.

6. The Iranian government is only required to do one thing: give up its nuclear project. It is warned that if it does not do so, the sanctions will never be removed, but go on forever. And as Iran becomes steadily poorer, it will become steadily weaker, and even with a few nuclear weapons, will find itself unable to protect Shi'a populations outside of Iran (say, in Afghanistan, or in Bahrain, or in Lebanon); it will be easier for Sunni Arabs to prey on Iran itself. It is not farfetched to imagine the oil-bearing region of Khuzistan, largely populated by ethnic Arabs, and that part of western Baluchistan which is in Iran's east, and is largely populated by Sunnis, both wanting to break away. And if the Kurds in western Iran were to do so, in order to join the Kurds now practically autonomous in northern Iraq, or the Azeris, fed up with Islamic fanatics, wanted to take control of the territory they inhabit in Iran and join it to secular and therefore comparatively advanced Azerbaijan, what would then be left of Iran?

This Grand Bargain would require that the Iranians come to their senses, soon. 

And that is unlikely. The Iranians and the Americans -- they just can't get started. Don't get me started.

Posted on 06/12/2012 5:49 PM by Hugh Fitzgerald
Comments
12 Jun 2012
Send an emailMel

And here's Lee Smith arguing for the exact opposite strategy two weeks ago:

www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/100967/the-enemies-of-our-enemies



12 Jun 2012
Hugh Fitzgerald

Not exactly the opposite. .

Smith, I  see, described Shi'a Iran  as -a greater menace than Sunni Muslims for now, that is, as long as Iran is still attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. I was proposing a way to make Iran agree to halt its nuclear weapons program, but retain its military strenght in conventional weapons, and to regain, through an end to sanctions, some of the economic strength it has lost.

In the Iranian military, there are those who sense that the attempt, by the Islamic Republic of Iran, to become the head of Islam's war with the West, can never be achieved. And they, like Shi'a Muslims in the West -- see hints from Vali Nasr, for example -- must worry over whether Shi'a Muslims even have a future, or will, in the Middle East and outside it, succumb to Sunni hostility and aggression.

There are those who think that in helping to overthrow the Alawites, we will be doing a good thing and weakening Iran. But this will only make the Iranian regime more eager to acquire nuclear weapons. If the Alawites are not interfered with, and if Iran could be made to understand that the Americans do not wish the Shi'a particular ill, and signal a willigness to end sanctions when the nuclear project has been stopped, so that Iran will be able to keep its conventional weaponry in order to deal with Sunni or Arab threats (within Iran, in Baluchistan and Khuzistan, and in the Gulf, with the islands, and Bahrain, both claimed by Iran).

It's not a bad idea. But as I wrote, there's no time to bring the Iranian military to its senses, and the clerics are hopelessly chiliastic (sensu lato), and beyond rational appeal. .






Most Recent Posts at The Iconoclast
Search The Iconoclast
Enter text, Go to search:
The Iconoclast Posts by Author
The Iconoclast Archives
sun mon tue wed thu fri sat
    1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 16 17 18
19 20 21 22 23 24 25
26 27 28 29 30 31  

Subscribe