This is Carole Malone in the Mirror. Carole Malone writes the Mirror's 'bitch column'. I grew up on the Daily Mirror in the 50s and 60s when it was a good campaigning popular (but not dumb) working class newspaper. It went downhill in the 80s and cancelling it was a easy economy to make. These days it slavishly follows the Labour party line and sponsors pro Islamic, anti UKIP agitators Hope not Hate. Whether Mrs Malone's bluntness signals the beginning of the end of sponsorship for HnH or the end of her career at the Mirror I don't know. But her bluntness and Hope not Hate's reaction to the grooming here in the Yorkshire Post ( Nick Lowles, of Hope not Hate, said: “The evil that is abuse happens across all areas of society. This is not an issue of race or religion. . . We also need to ensure that the media, and far-right groups, do not promote an anti-Muslim agenda over so-called ‘grooming’ trials) are not going to be easy bedfellows.
Why did only one Muslim cleric have the guts to say it? Why was everyone else scared to? Why are they STILL scared to?
And why – even after all the sickening stories of those Oxford schoolgirls having babies aborted with hooks, being repeatedly gang-raped, beaten, branded and burned with cigarettes – are people STILL shying away from saying exactly what kind of crimes these are?
Because what happened to these girls can’t just be chucked in the box marked “general sex crimes”.
These gang atrocities in Oxford – just like the ones in Rochdale, Derby and Telford – were the very worst kind of racially motivated hate crimes committed by Muslim men who’ve been taught to believe that white women are worthless trash and deserve to be punished for their “decadent” Western lifestyle, i.e. wearing make-up and short skirts.
And while most Muslim clerics have stayed silent on this, while our wider society refuses to acknowledge what these crimes are REALLY about, only Dr Taj Hargey, imam of the Oxford Islamic congregation, had the courage to stick his head above the parapet and say what happened to these girls WAS racially motivated and illustrates the deep- seated hatred some Muslim men have for white women.
“Some people are saying the predators’ religion was an irrelevance. But that’s deluded nonsense,” he says.
So why aren’t the police saying that? Why aren’t Oxford social services? Because only when the ugly truth is acknowledged – that in supposedly integrated Britain, some Muslim men (NOT necessarily Asian men) are targeting young white girls to abuse and degrade – can the problem be tackled.
But having seen how our gutless authorities operate on issues involving race, they knew they could defile white girls however and wherever they chose.
These women, (Thames Valley Chief constable Sara Thornton who earns £160,000 a year and Head of Oxfordshire social services Joanna Simmons who earns£182,000 a year, neither of whom have plans to resign) just like everyone else in this horror story, did nothing to confront this evil because to do so might have led to accusations of racism.
And everyone knows that in Britain today the quickest way to have your career wrecked is to be branded a racist.
And it’s because of this insidious political correctness that some Muslims appear to have been given immunity to the rules and the moral codes that apply to everyone else. And while some allowances made in the name of religion don’t matter, the wholesale degradation of vulnerable young white women DOES!
Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich has called for the expulsion of Islamic religious leaders who preach hate and said Germany’s laws must be changed to accomplish that.
Friedrich, in an interview published Saturday in the Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung, said, “we have to legally make it clear that using violence to accomplish a religious goal results in an automatic expulsion.”
Friedrich said he will introduce a draft bill at the conference of state interior ministers next week that calls for laws to tougher expulsion laws for extremists.
The paper asked if he was also in favor of making it easier for the government to curb social welfare payments to religious leaders who preach hate.
Friedrich said, “We want to make sure that hate preachers leave the country as soon as possible, then such a question becomes irrelevant.”
The interior minister also warned that Syria is becoming a magnet for European Islamic fighters and estimated that some 30 German Islamists are currently in Jihadist training camps in Syria. “It is to be feared that sooner or later these Islamists will come back against us.”
Al-Qaeda's Syrian wing is helping to finance its activities by selling the product of oilfields that once helped to prop up the regime of Bashar al-Assad.
Up to 380,000 barrels of crude oil were previously produced by wells around the city of Raqqa and in the desert region to its east that are now in rebel hands - in particular Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda off-shoot which is the strongest faction in this part of the country.
Now the violently anti-Western jihadist group, which has been steadily extending its control in the region, is selling the crude oil to local entrepreneurs, who use home-made refineries to produce low-grade petrol and other fuels for Syrians facing acute shortages.
In the battle for the future of the rebel cause, the oil-fields may begin to play an increasingly strategic role. All are in the three provinces closest to Iraq - Hasakeh, Deir al-Zour, and Raqqa, while the Iraqi border regions are the homeland of the Islamic State of Iraq, as al-Qaeda's branch in the country calls itself. It was fighters from Islamic State of Iraq, both Iraqi and Syrian, who are thought to have founded Jabhat al-Nusra as the protests against the rule of President Assad turned into civil war.
Because of sanctions, Jabhat's oil is largely shipped to thousands of home-built mini-refineries that have sprung up across the north of the country. The crude is distilled in hand-welded vats dug into the ground and heated with burning oil residue.
It is not clear how much money is being channelled back to the group. But all those buying the raw product were aware that Jabhat was profiting. "Jabhat do not ask for taxes or charges for this trade," said one of them, Omar Mahmoud, from Raqqa province. "But we are buying the oil from them so they do not need to."
Syria's oil output, never as great as that of some of Syria's Arab neighbours, fell to about 130,000 barrels a day after the outbreak of the revolution against the Assad regime.
However, Jabhat al-Nusra are now putting that to good use. The homes refineries are turning out poor quality but usable – and much-needed - petrol and kerosene for cooking and home stoves. Their product might not meet the quality, and certainly the health and safety standards, demanded by Shell or ExxonMobil, but it provides a living to thousands of blackened figures willing to risk the business's inherent dangers. In parts of north-east Syria, the stills are set up by every road-side, the produce sold like fruit from lay-bys to drivers as they pass.
Near Raqqa, they pay 4000 Syrian pounds (£20) a barrel, with the price rising for smaller quantities and as the distance increases. A single refining vat can take six barrels at a time, producing maybe 30 litres of petrol, similar quantities of cooking fuel and higher amounts of diesel.
Jabhat have used their greater proficiency at fighting, honed by jihad in Iraq and elsewhere, to take a leading role at the battlefront. "They are more disciplined," Abu Hamza, a fighter with a rival Islamist rebel brigade in Aleppo admitted. "When they attack, they make a plan first, and then stick to it."
Their battlefield supremacy has enabled them to seize the economic as well as the military high-ground. In Raqqa, they also control flour production, earning money from selling to bakeries, some of which they own as well. "Jabhat now own everything here," one disillusioned secular activist said.
In other places they sell the flour at a loss, further endearing them to the local population. Well-funded anyway from foreign contributions, they are able to avoid levying the fees – some say bribes – to pay their men and for supplies that have made other brigades increasingly unpopular. That in turn has been a major boon to recruitment, with thousands defecting to them.
Not long ago I bought a book, published in 1922, entitled Syphilis of the Innocent. Needless to say, the title implied a corollary: for if syphilis could be contracted by the innocent (as, for example, in the congenital form of the disease), it could also be contracted by the guilty.
In general, however, physicians do not inquire after the morals of their patients, except in so far as those morals have immediate pathological consequences. They do not refuse to treat patients because they find them disgusting, because they find them unappealing, because they are appalled by the way they choose to live. They try to treat them as they find them; they may inform, but they do not reprehend.
However, in practice things are sometimes more complex than this ecumenical generosity of spirit might suggest. According to an article in a recent edition of the New England Journal of Medicine, some doctors have been turning away patients on the grounds that they were too fat (one physician suggested that she did so because, ridiculously, she feared for the safety of her staff once the patients weighed more than 200 pounds), or that their children have gone unimmunised. Is such discrimination by physicians legitimate or illegitimate, legally or morally speaking? Is there not a danger that physicians may hide behind pseudo-medical justifications to express their personal prejudices or to coerce patients into doing what the physicians think is good for them?
Let us take the question of immunization of children as an example. Some general practitioners have refused to treat families whose children are not immunized according to the recommended schedule. They do so on the grounds that a visit to the doctor’s office by an unimmunized child may pose a threat to children who happen to be visiting at the same time. Yet the empirical risk is probably not known and very likely to be small, if it exists: probably much smaller than that of leaving a child of a crankish family without medical advice. In other words, the refusal is an expression of the physician’s irritation, perhaps even of wounded amour propre, rather than of concern for the welfare of children.
Obesity also raises questions of medico-political philosophy. Surgeons, for example, sometimes refuse to operate on very fat people, especially for conditions that are not life-threatening, because the results are poorer and the rate of complications higher. This is important not only for the patient, but for the surgeon who might be judged by his results. No doubt physicians who refuse to treat the fat are more likely to see them as weak-willed rather than the victims of genetic endowment, physiology or even of society; but some doctors refuse to treat the fat on the grounds that they do not have the special equipment needed to do so. The authors of the article suggest that this is wrong; that the correct approach is that they, the doctors, ought to buy the necessary equipment. The authors, though, do not tackle the question of who is to pay for it: the doctors, the fat themselves, or the other patients? The answer given will depend crucially on one’s moral attitude to obesity.
In practice, say the authors, not many patients face discrimination; doctors still try to do their best for people as they find them. But they conclude:
Overt discrimination is rare. Evidence suggests, however, that even medical professionals are susceptible to implicit discrimination based on race, social class, sex, weight, and myriad other factors that may affect the care they provide.
This sounds ominously like an Inquisition’s charter to me. Perhaps there can be no freedom without tolerance of discrimination.
Why could the vicious bloody civil war in Syria now spill over into a new war between Syria and Israel? Israel has tried to stay out of the internecine bloodbath of a civil war that has been raging inside Syria for some two years. Since the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Bashar regime has strictly enforced the cease-fire agreement with Israel. Israeli and Syrian forces did clash during the First Lebanon War in Lebanon, but even that did not boil over into an all-out war along the Israeli-Syrian border on the Golan Heights. But in the midst of the rebels' attempt to topple the Assad regime, Israel drew a red line: Israeli forces would intervene if the Syrian government tried to ship its chemical weapons or 'game-changing' weapons across the border to Hezbollah, its ally in Lebanon that has repeatedly attacked Israel. Last January, Israeli intelligence detected that a Syrian truck convoy was travelling to Lebanon with a shipment of advanced Russian made SA-17 anti-aircraft missiles that could pose a serious threat to Israeli aircrafts. The convoy was bombed, reportedly by Israeli jets. And now this month, Israeli jets, reportedly from inside Lebanese air space, carried out two separate air strikes destroying more shipments bound for Hezbollah that included Fateh-110 surface to surface missiles that could reach Tel Aviv if launched from the Lebanese border area. Israel did not accept responsibility for any of these air strikes in order not to force Assad to retaliate. However, a Pentagon official apparently screwed up and leaked the story that indeed it was Israel!
Now put on the spot, a Syrian official declared that in the event of any future Israeli attack, Syrian forces were under orders to retaliate immediately. Iran also pressured Assad to permit Hezbollah to open a military front against Israel on the Golan Heights which has, by and large, remained quiet except for some errant shells and rockets fighting by the warring parties inside Syria. In return, an Israeli official telephoned the New York Times correspondent in Jerusalem, warning that if Syria attacked Israel on the Golan, Israel would topple the Assad regime. The last thing President Bashar Assad needed now was to get into a war with Israel. Assad's top priority is to survive by weathering, with Russia's solid support, the rebel offensive which he has done despite most predictions that his days were numbered.
The plot thickens, and from Moscow's perspective things are getting out of hand. After Russia has lost Egypt, Iraq, and most recently Libya, President Vladimir Putin is determined not to lose Syria and his naval bases in the Mediterranean port of Tartus. In a clear message to both the U.S. and Israel, a number of Russian naval vessels were dispatched to the Mediterranean. Russia has been supplying Assad's army with weapons while the West has enforced a partial arms embargo on the rebels (however Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been arming them surreptitiously). Moscow has a signed but unfilled agreement to sell S-300 state-of-the-art anti-aircraft missiles to Syria. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced that although Moscow would not sign any new agreements with Assad, it was duty bound to honor prior arms sales. This sounded alarm bells in Jerusalem. On a trip to China, Netanyahu telephoned U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington to discuss the situation. And immediately on his return from China, the Prime Minister telephoned Putin who invited him to come to the Black Sea resort of Sochi for an urgent meeting where he publicly expressed his displeasure over the Israeli air strikes on Syria: 'At this crucial period it is especially important to refrain from any moves that can further shake the situation'. And what did Netanyahu tell Putin? Channel 2 TV in Israel has reported the Prime Minister as saying: 'The sale to Syria would likely draw Israel into a response, possibly propelling the region into war'. While interviewed on Channel 10 TV, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin, a former chief of IDF Intelligence, said: 'To some extent, the current situation reminds me of the time before the outbreak of the Six Day War in 1967'.
The U.S., which wants to stay out of the Syrian conflagration, has warned: 'The Russian missile shipment to Syria will embolden Assad and prolong the conflict".
Isracast Assessment: Over the past two days Israel has signaled to Syria and Russia that it wants to cool the tension. Interviewed on Israel Radio, Maj. Gen.(ret.) Amos Gilad a top adviser in the Defense Ministry, who often articulates defense policy, made this conciliatory statement: 'President Assad is in control of the Syrian Army's weapons systems and behaves responsibly toward Israel while realizing the force (Israel) that is facing him. Israel is not acting intentionally against the regime of Bashar Assad and the Israeli air strikes in Syria are motivated self-defense'.
Several hours later a senior IDF intelligence officer told the Times of London that Israel actually preferred that Assad remain in power: 'Better the devil we know than the demons we can only imagine if Syria falls into chaos, and extremists from across the Arab world gain a foothold there'.
This should not come as a surprise. The Israeli intelligence assessment is that if Assad falls, Syria will fracture into 'cantons' controlled by various communities Alawites and Christians, Shiites, Sunnis, and the Kurds with Jihadist warlords and their forces, without any central control. In the midst of this pandemonium and a likely bloodbath, what will become of the Syrian army's large arsenal of chemical weapons and missiles? From the Israeli point of view, the Assad regimes of Hafez and Bashar, have managed to keep the lid on and preserved the cease-fire along the Golan Heights. What has upset this delicate balance is Bashar Assad's decision to start sending 'game changing' weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon in return for Hezbollah fighters now stationed in Syria. Israel will not tolerate this move by Assad, and intervened last January. Assad apparently got that message but has now tried again. Again, Israel responded on May 3 and May 5. With the 'help' of a U.S. Pentagon official, Assad was forced to respond publically, Israel did not back down, and the Russians are now involved on Assad's side and 'Bob's your uncle'. How to defuse the current situation? Senior Israeli officials have just clarified that Israel not only does not want to get involved in Syria, but actually prefers that Assad remain in power rather than al Qaeda or other Muslim fanatics. Assad has indicated that he is in no position to take on Israel at this time, so if he stopped trying to send dangerous weapons to Hezbollah, Israel would have no reason to launch air strikes on Syria. Presumably Netanyahu conveyed this message to Putin when they met in Sochi on May 13. If so, can Putin persuade Assad to stop shipping weapons to Hezbollah? The Russian leader certainly has the leverage to do so. If this assessment does not hold water and Russia does send the S-300 missiles to Syria, Israel, which views such a step as a threat to her vital security interest, may very well strike.
But then there's Iran...
Why did Assad risk getting into hot water with Israel by sending lethal weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon? The answer is likely to be found with his Iranian ally. The Iranians are interested in stirring the pot as much as they can, and that includes strengthening Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah. It would appear that Tehran urged Assad to ship some of his most sophisticated weaponry to Hezbollah. What Assad didn't count on is that Israel's intelligence would detect this gambit. If so, who has greater influence on Assad these days, Russia or Iran? But you can bet Iran's leaders are rubbing their hands over the focus of international attention now on Syria and not on their nuclear weapons program.
Naturally, Israel Sensibly Prefers A Weakened Assad To Cling To Power, Just
From the Jerusalem Post:
Report: Israel prefers Assad survive Syria conflict
By JPOST.COM STAFF 18/05/2013
'Times of London' quotes Israeli officer as saying Israel prefers "the devil it knows."
The scenario that Syrian President Bashar Assad would survive his country's bloody conflict, yet would hold a lesser role, would be preferred by Israel in contrast to a takeover by rebel factions with Islamic extremist inklings, The Times of London cited an Israeli official as saying Friday.
“Better the devil we know than the demons we can only imagine if Syria falls into chaos and the extremists from across the Arab world gain a foothold there,” one senior Israeli intelligence officer was quoted as saying.
A weakened, but intact Assad regime would be preferable for Syria and the Middle East, the Times reported intelligence sources as saying.
The report quoted another defense official who told the Times that Assad's tenacity had been underestimated.
“We originally underestimated Assad’s staying power and overestimated the rebels’ fighting power,” the source said.
The situation that Assad survives, maintaining power in Damascus and in the corridors to the large coastal cities, would entail the breaking up of Syria into three separate states.
The remarks come amid current differing opinions within the defense establishment about what to expect in Syria and what outcome for its northern neighbor would benefit Israel.
According to the official, Israel has "underestimated" Assad's strength and the inner life force of the Syrian regime.
The defense establishment however, maintains its view stressing that all scenarios are possible in Syria and a change in policy by the West that would lead to military intervention could tip the scales toward one side or the other.
ROME - A 22-year-old Moroccan man has been sentenced to more than five years in prison for planning terrorist attacks on Milan’s main synagogue and Jewish school.The five year and four month sentence against Mohamed Jarmoune was handed down by a court in Brescia on Thursday.
Jarmoune, who has lived in Italy since childhood, was arrested in Brescia in March 2012.
In Afghanistan, The Sharia Is Upheld, And Women's Rights Denied
Conservative Afghan lawmakers block law protecting women, saying it is against Islam
May 18, 2013
KABUL, Afghanistan – An Afghan legislator says conservative lawmakers have blocked a law that aims to protect women's freedoms, saying parts of it violate Islamic principles.
The failure highlights how tenuous women's rights remain a dozen years after the ouster of the hard-line Taliban regime, whose strict interpretation of Islam kept Afghan women virtual prisoners in their homes.
The law has actually been in effect since 2009 by presidential decree. Lawmaker Fawzia Kofi wants to cement it with a parliamentary vote to prevent its future reversal.
Among its provisions are bans on child marriage and the traditional practice of selling and buying women to settle disputes.
Kofi said the law was introduced in parliament Saturday but met such fierce opposition that it was withdrawn. It wasn't immediately clear to which parts they objected.
INTERVIEW - Le cinéaste présente à Cannes, hors compétition, Le Dernier des injustes, film qui réhabilite le rabbin Benjamin Murmelstein, figure controversée de la Shoah.
À 88 ans, Claude Lanzmann ne se croyait plus capable de se lancer dans un nouveau film sur la Shoah. Pourtant, il se savait dépositaire d'un témoignage unique, celui de Benjamin Murmelstein, dernier doyen du conseil juif du ghetto de Theresienstadt. Après des années de réflexion, l'auteur du Lièvre de Patagonie a fini par relever le défi. Son film Le Dernier des injustes est présenté à Cannes dimanche hors compétition et sortira en salle en novembre 2013.
LE FIGARO. - Qu'est-ce qui vous a poussé à entreprendre ce film sur une figure aussi controversée que le rabbin Benjamin Murmelstein?
Claude LANZMANN. - Ce personnage a d'abord été l'un des premiers témoins que j'ai interviewés lorsque j'ai commencé à réfléchir à l'élaboration de Shoah. À l'époque, j'étais fasciné par la question des conseils juifs. Lui était l'un des seuls survivants du camp de Theresienstadt. Pour moi, Theresienstadt est l'acmé de la cruauté et de la perversité nazie. Pire que tout! Donc, le cas de Murmelstein m'intriguait. De plus, l'homme a souvent été victime d'une image négative. Mais ce n'était que des on-dit. C'est pourquoi je me suis rendu à Rome pour l'interviewer en 1975. Nous avons tourné durant une semaine. C'était passionnant et surprenant.
Parce que j'ai été surpris par cet homme. Il a été d'une honnêteté parfaite. Très rapidement, je me suis rendu compte que c'était un type astucieux, inventif, courageux, héroïque on peut dire. Il vivait alors en exil à Rome, mis au ban du judaïsme organisé, de façon totalement injuste. Il n'a jamais pu se rendre en Israël. Il s'était volontairement livré aux autorités tchèques. Et croyez-moi, les tribunaux tchèques ce n'était pas de la rigolade: il y avait énormément de pendaisons. Il a été acquitté des faits qui lui étaient reprochés.
Quelles ont été vos premières impressions quand vous l'avez rencontré?
Je croyais que Benjamin était un homme assez violent, un gueulard. J'ai découvert un être d'une brillante intelligence, d'une grande finesse d'esprit. Il avait un sens de la repartie. Il était très drôle par-dessus le marché. Sardonique même. Il ne se racontait pas d'histoire et n'acceptait pas qu'on lui en raconte. Il était d'une culture fabuleuse, connaissait toutes les mythologies du monde, c'était un véritable savant talmudique. Sur l'échiquier du mal, il s'est toujours débrouillé pour avoir six coups d'avance sur les nazis.
Quelle a été l'étincelle qui a ranimé votre envie de faire ce film?
Je vais vous le dire. L'étincelle, c'est d'abord une vieille envie, quelque chose qui me hantait depuis longtemps. Il y a eu tant de bêtises qui ont été dites depuis le procès Eichmann, qui est une honte en vérité, parce que c'est un procès d'ignorants. Le Dernier des injustes apporte un éclairage total sur la personnalité d'Eichmann. Celui-ci n'apparaît plus comme un «falot bureaucrate», mais plutôt comme un démon, fanatiquement antisémite, violent, corrompu. Hannah Arendt, qui n'avait connu tout cela que de très loin, a raconté beaucoup d'absurdités à ce sujet. La banalité du mal n'est rien d'autre que la banalité de ses propres conclusions. Même si, par ailleurs, elle a écrit des ouvrages valables. Mais ça, ce n'est pas ce qu'elle a fait de mieux. Vraiment!
« J'ai aussi réalisé qu'il fallait que je sois dans le film, ce que je n'avais pas compris immédiatement »
Est-ce cela le déclencheur?
Ça et un autre souvenir. Comme je ne pouvais pas entreposer tout le matériel que j'avais amassé avec les années à Paris, je l'ai confié à l'Holocauste Memorial Museum de Washington. Ils ont tout numérisé et restauré. Je leur avais dit que ce matériel brut pouvait être utilisé par des chercheurs. Il y a six ans, alors que j'assistais à la projection d'un documentaire à Vienne sur la Shoah, soudain, je me suis vu, moi, à l'écran, en train d'interviewer Murmelstein. J'ai réalisé: «Mais c'est moi, tout ça!» J'ai ressenti ça comme un vol. Alors, j'ai décidé de faire ce film. Et de le faire comme une œuvre d'art, pas comme un documentaire. Nous avons tourné durant deux mois l'année dernière, je suis retourné sur les lieux, à Theresienstadt, en Pologne, à Prague, à Rome, en Israël. J'ai aussi réalisé qu'il fallait que je sois dans le film, ce que je n'avais pas compris immédiatement. Car je porte le film physiquement et psychologiquement à deux âges de ma vie. Ainsi, je ressuscite enfin Murmelstein.
C'était votre objectif?
Oui. Je voulais lui rendre enfin justice et apporter réparation. Je trouve qu'on s'est très mal conduit avec cet homme.
Être à Cannes, qu'est-ce que ça représente pour vous?
C'est une belle invitation. J'en suis très heureux. Cannes est un lieu idéal pour montrer un film et permettre aux gens d'en parler partout.
S'agit-il de votre dernier film?
On pourrait le dire. Mais je ne le crois pas. Après que j'ai reçu l'ours d'or à Berlin, je présente mon film à Cannes, ce n'est pas mal pour un homme de mon âge. Croyez bien que je ne prends pas ma retraite. J'ai même un nouveau projet. Je ne peux encore rien vous en dire, mais ça viendra…
In France, Families Receiving About $100,000 A Year In Support Will See A Reduction
An American reading the headline may not quite believe it: in France, many families -- apparently 15% of those that exist, or is it 15% of those on welfare -- have been receiving monthly allowances of 5,000 or 6,000 Euros. That amounts to about $100,000 a year. The amount depends on the number of children. Which families in France consist of unemployed parents and a great number of children?
15% des ménages pénalisés par la baisse des allocations familiales
1. I was invited to a discussion of the Israeli Documentary Filmmakers Forum recently. To prepare, I watched the two films that represented Israel in the American Academy Awards' documentary film category -- Dror Moreh's "The Gatekeepers" and "5 Broken Cameras" by Emad Burnat and Guy Davidi. Despite the harsh reviews they received, I recommend seeing them. They represent a perspective that needs to be dealt with.
I'll write about "The Gatekeepers" now and save "5 Broken Cameras" for another time. The sycophantic interviews of Dror Moreh in the American media did not bode well for his ability to decode the riddle of the heads of the Shin Bet. They do not say much that is deep in the film. Perhaps this is because Moreh could not deal with such minds or because he was interested not in psychological or intellectual depth, but rather in the political story in which the heads of the Shin Bet served as statistics to fill in the left wing's version of the failure of the Oslo Accords.
The theme of "shooting and weeping" has been well known since we came back to our country and had to defend it with our lives, together with the necessity of taking the lives of others. Now even the heads of the Shin Bet have doubts. This either-or quality is the bread and butter of drama: morality versus terrorism, combat versus conscience, control versus the desire for liberty. The film opens with former Shin Bet director Yuval Diskin's motto: "There's something unnatural about taking the lives of people in a single second."
His predecessor, Avraham Shalom, gives away the film's implied position: "Because of terrorism, we forget the issue of the Palestinian state." Why did we forget? Maybe terrorism was the goal from the onset, and the Palestinians actually never wanted a state? But Moreh is not showing statements that could put cracks in his narrative.
While the film pretends to present complexity, it never fulfills its promise. It shows the world as black and white, and the historical excerpts have no profound context. The Six-Day War. A Palestinian population. Occupation. That's it. There's no discussion about our historical, religious and cultural context as a nation living in this region. Not a word about our principled claim to sovereignty over it.
2. One of the film's focal points is the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, but not as a failure of the Shin Bet; Moreh doesn't ask uncomfortable questions. He does not ask about the Shin Bet's involvement; the use of the agent Avishai Raviv, who was close to assassin Yigal Amir; or about the dilemma of planting provocateurs among the settlers. The settlers are shown in the context of madness, irrationality and menace. The Jewish underground of the time appears as a stereotype that is supposed to represent the entire settlement enterprise. It seemed that in those parts of the film, we were back in the 1980s, when there was no color television in Israel, but only black (the settlers) and white.
Moreh repeats the lie of the demonstration at Zion Square on Oct. 5, 1995 against the Oslo Accords as if those who were on the balcony had seen the photo montage of Rabin in an SS uniform. Had he read the Shamgar Commission report's secret fourth chapter about Avishai Raviv, he would have found out who distributed the photo in the media. (Surprise: It was a Shin Bet agent.) Moreh also repeats the lie about Netanyahu and the coffin that was carried during another demonstration that was said to represent Rabin. That same year, students demonstrated with coffins representing the death of higher education. The coffin at the demonstration symbolized the death of Zionism, not of Rabin, as the writing on it clearly shows. But Moreh is not looking for truth. He seeks only to confirm his version of events, and uses Rabin's assassination to show what he sees as the right wing's culpability.
This point is important because Rabin's assassination could have served as a profound mirror for decoding something in the enigmatic personalities of the heads of the Shin Bet. But Moreh is interested only in the oft-repeated, two-dimensional complaint: the occupation. Moreh's version of events posits that the killing of Yahya Ayyash, who was responsible for the murder of so many Israelis, led to a chain of suicide bombings. Those bombings, as he sees it, were our fault.
The Second Intifada, which broke out in September 2000, is explained similarly. Ami Ayalon gives a justification for it, and there is no mention of how Arafat planned it in advance, as most experts claim. There is no historical context, only the platitude "violence breeds violence," a vague equation that draws its nourishment from moral relativism and rejects the idea that a righteous person is any different from a wicked one. No distinction is made between good and evil; everything, including the victim's attempt to defend himself, is bound up in the general concept of "violence." On second thought, the film actually does decide who is good and who is evil.
Avraham Shalom, who was the head of the Shin Bet when the Bus 300 affair took place, plays a prominent role in the film. In April 1984, terrorists who hijacked a bus were captured, bound and killed. Shalom was considered the toughest of the six Shin Bet heads, and it is hard to get away from the impression that he wanted to clear himself. But nothing can clear Shalom of his statement in the film that our army resembles the German army during World War II (!).
Indeed, he qualifies the statement: He's not referring to the way the German army treated the Jews, but the way it treated the Belgians, the Poles and so on. Still, Shalom had hundreds of examples to choose from, but chose one that makes a clear statement: The Israel Defense Forces resemble the Nazi army. After such a foolish statement, can one ever claim otherwise? And as if that were not enough, Ayalon comes along and calls the targeted killings "the banality of evil." From where I sit, that's the peak of the film and a distillation of Moreh's basic assumption.
3. To understand how banal it is to drop intellectual bombshells, we should remember where the expression comes from. It is taken from the title of the book the German-Jewish philosopher Hannah Arendt wrote about Adolf Eichmann's trial in 1961: "Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil." For Arendt, Eichmann was a man of ordinary character, a "banal" man who participated in the greatest crime in history.
Now, here comes Ayalon's analogy. He compares Israel's adherence to the moral dictum of "if one comes to kill you, rise early and kill him first" to the banality of evil. In such a comparison, there is no choice but to see Israel's defensive surgical strikes as evil. The comparison does not stop there; it goes backward in time to Eichmann and his actions, which are the source of the expression.
So it is that two heads of the Shin Bet compare Israel to Nazi Germany. Can there be a clearer expression of the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of Israel's old-time elite? A thousand public-relations teams throughout the world can never overcome the moral failure of those to whom we entrusted our security. These awful statements are exactly what the director wanted. An analysis of the film reveals his view that Israel's actions in Judea and Samaria are equivalent to the acts of the Germans in World War II.
Moreh chooses to end the film with a highly significant scene: Palestinian detainees in their underwear. As is customary for him, he offers no explanation for the detainees' nakedness, which stems from the fear that they may be wearing explosive belts. What remains in the viewers' memories is the photograph of the Palestinians whom the wicked Israeli system has forced, in its banal arbitrariness, to undress and pass by en masse.
Thus far the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has weathered the storm that has swept across the Middle East since the beginning of the year. But the relative calm in Amman is an illusion. The unspoken truth is that the Palestinians, the country's largest ethnic group, have developed a profound hatred of the regime and view the Hashemites as occupiers of eastern Palestine—intruders rather than legitimate rulers. This, in turn, makes a regime change in Jordan more likely than ever. Such a change, however, would not only be confined to the toppling of yet another Arab despot but would also open the door to the only viable peace solution—and one that has effectively existed for quite some time: a Palestinian state in Jordan.
Abdullah's Apartheid Policies
The majority Palestinian population of Jordan bridles at the advantages and benefits bestowed on the minority Bedouins. Advancement in the civil service, as well as in the military, is almost entirely a Bedouin prerogative with the added insult that Palestinians pay the lion's share of the country's taxes.
Despite having held a comprehensive national census in 2004, the Jordanian government would not divulge the exact percentage of Palestinians in the kingdom. Nonetheless, the secret that everyone seems to know but which is never openly admitted is that Palestinians make up the vast majority of the population.
In his 2011 book, Our Last Best Chance, King Abdullah claimed that the Palestinians make up a mere 43 percent. The U.S. State Department estimates that Palestinians make up "more than half" of Jordanians while in a 2007 report, written in cooperation with several Jordanian government bodies, the London-based Oxford Business Group stated that at least two thirds of Jordan's population were of Palestinian origin. Palestinians make up the majority of the population of Jordan's two largest cities, Amman and Zarqa, which were small, rural towns before the influx of Palestinians arrived in 1967 after Jordan's defeat in the Six-Day War.
In most countries with a record of human rights violations, vulnerable minorities are the typical victims. This has not been the case in Jordan where a Palestinian majority has been discriminated against by the ruling Hashemite dynasty, propped up by a minority Bedouin population, from the moment it occupied Judea and Samaria during the 1948 war (these territories were annexed to Jordan in April 1950 to become the kingdom's West Bank).
As a result, the Palestinians of Jordan find themselves discriminated against in government and legislative positions as the number of Palestinian government ministers and parliamentarians decreases; there is not a single Palestinian serving as governor of any of Jordan's twelve governorships.
Jordanian Palestinians are encumbered with tariffs of up to 200 percent for an average family sedan, a fixed 16-percent sales tax, a high corporate tax, and an inescapable income tax. Most of their Bedouin fellow citizens, meanwhile, do not have to worry about most of these duties as they are servicemen or public servants who get a free pass. Servicemen or public employees even have their own government-subsidized stores, which sell food items and household goods at lower prices than what others have to pay, and the Military Consumer Corporation, which is a massive retailer restricted to Jordanian servicemen, has not increased prices despite inflation.
Decades of such practices have left the Palestinians in Jordan with no political representation, no access to power, no competitive education, and restrictions in the only field in which they can excel: business.
According to the Minority Rights Group International's World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples of 2008, "Jordan still considers them [Palestinian-Jordanians] refugees with a right of return to Palestine." This by itself is confusing enough for the Palestinian majority and possibly gives basis for state-sponsored discrimination against them; indeed, since 2008, the Jordanian government has adopted a policy of stripping some Palestinians of their citizenship. Thousands of families have borne the brunt of this action with tens of thousands more potentially affected. The Jordanian government has officially justified its position: Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Nayef Qadi told the London-based al-Hayat newspaper that "Jordan should be thanked for standing up against Israeli ambitions of unloading the Palestinian land of its people" which he described as "the secret Israeli aim to impose a solution of Palestinian refugees at the expense of Jordan." According to a February 2010 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, some 2,700 Jordanian-Palestinians have had their citizenship revoked. As HRW obtained the figure from the Jordanian government, it is safe to assume that the actual figure is higher. To use the words of Sarah Leah Whitson, executive director of the Middle East and North Africa division of HRW, "Jordan is playing politics with the basic rights of thousands of its citizens."
But Abdullah does not really want the Palestinians out of his kingdom. For it is the Palestinians who drive the country's economy: They pay heavy taxes; they receive close to zero state benefits; they are almost completely shut out of government jobs, and they have very little, if any, political representation. He is merely using them as pawns in his game against Israel by threatening to make Jerusalem responsible for Jordanians of Palestinian descent in the name of the "right of return."
Despite systematic marginalization, Palestinians in Jordan seem well-settled and, indeed, do call Jordan home. Hundreds of thousands hold "yellow cards" and "green cards," residency permits allowing them to live and work in Israel while they maintain their Jordanian citizenship. In addition, tens of thousands of Palestinians—some even claim hundreds of thousands—hold Israeli residency permits, which allow them to live in Judea and Samaria. Many also hold a "Jerusalem Residency Card," which entitles them to state benefits from Israel. Yet they have remained in Jordan. Despite ill treatment by the Jordanian government, they still wish to live where most of their relatives and family members live and perhaps actually consider Jordan home.
Playing the Islamist Card
The Hashemites' discriminatory policies against the Palestinians have been overlooked by the West, Washington in particular, for one main reason: the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was the beating heart of Palestinian politics, and thus, if the Palestinians were empowered, they might topple the Hashemites and transform Jordan into a springboard for terror attacks against Israel. This fear was not all that farfetched. The Palestinian National Charter, by which the PLO lives, considers Palestine with its original mandate borders (i.e., including the territory east of the Jordan River, or Transjordan) as the indivisible homeland of the Palestinian Arab people. In the candid admission of Abu Dawoud, Yasser Arafat's strongman in the 1970s, "Abu Ammar [Arafat] was doing everything then to establish his power and authority in Jordan despite his public statements" in support of King Hussein. This tension led to the 1970 Black September civil war where the PLO was expelled from Jordan and thousands of Palestinians were slaughtered by Hussein's Bedouin army.
With the threat of Palestinian militants removed, the idea of having the Muslim Brotherhood entrenched in a Palestinian state with the longest border with Israel would naturally be of concern to Israel and its allies.
The only problem with this theory is that the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is dominated by Bedouins, not Palestinians. The prominent, hawkish Muslim Brotherhood figure, Zaki Bani Rushiad, for example, is a native of Irbid in northern Jordan—not a Palestinian. Salem Falahat, another outspoken Brotherhood leader, and Abdul Latif Arabiat, a major tribal figure and godfather of the Brotherhood in Jordan, are also non-Palestinians. Upon President Obama's announcement of the death of Osama bin Laden, tribal Jordanians in the southern city of Ma'an mourned the terror leader's death and announced "a celebration of martyrdom." Other cities with predominantly Bedouin populations, such as Salt and Kerak, did the same. The latter, a stronghold of the Majali tribe (which has historically held prominent positions in the Hashemite state) produced Abu Qutaibah al-Majali, bin Laden's personal aide between 1986 and 1991, who recruited fellow Bedouin-Jordanian, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, head of al-Qaeda in Iraq who was killed in a 2006 U.S. raid.
The Hashemite regime is keenly aware of U.S. and Israeli fears and has, therefore, striven to create a situation where the world would have to choose between the Hashemites and the Muslim Brotherhood as Jordan's rulers. To this end, it has supported the Muslim Brotherhood for decades, allowing it to operate freely, to run charitable organizations and youth movements, and to recruit members in Jordan. In 2008, the Jordanian government introduced a new law, retroactively banning any existing political party unless it had five hundred members and branches in five governorates (counties). Since such conditions could only be fulfilled by the Muslim Brotherhood, most political parties were dissolved de jure because they did not meet the new standards, leaving the Islamic Action Front as the strongest party in the kingdom.
Both Jerusalem and Washington are aware of the Jordanian status quo yet have chosen to accept the Hashemite regime as it is, seduced by the conventional wisdom of "the devil you know is better than the devil you don't." The facts on the ground, however, suggest that the devil they think they know is in deep trouble with its own supposed constituency.
The Bedouin Threat
Despite their lavish privileges, Jordanian Bedouins seem to insist relentlessly on a bigger piece of the cake, demanding more privileges from the king, and, in doing so, they have grown fearless about defying him. Since 2009, fully-armed tribal fights have become commonplace in Jordan. Increasingly, the Hashemite regime has less control than it would like over its only ruling foundation—the Bedouin minority—which makes up the army, the police forces, all the security agencies, and the Jordanian General Intelligence Department. The regime is, therefore, less likely to survive any serious confrontations with them and has no other choice but to keep kowtowing to their demands.
What complicates the situation even further is that Bedouin tribes in Jordan do not maintain alliances only with the Hashemites; most shift their loyalties according to their current interests and the political season. Northern tribes, for example, have exhibited loyalty to the Syrian regime, and many of their members hold dual citizenships. In September 1970, when Syrian forces invaded Jordan in the midst of the civil war there, the tribes of the northern city of Ramtha raised the Syrian flag and declared themselves "independent" from the Hashemite rulers.
Likewise, Bedouin tribes of the south have habitually traded loyalty for privileges and handouts with whoever paid better, beginning with the Turks, then replacing them with the better-paying Britons, and finally the Hashemites. This pattern has expanded in the last twenty years, as tribesmen exchanged their loyalties for cash; in fact this is how they got involved in the British-supported Arab revolt of World War I, in which the Bedouins demanded to be paid in gold in advance in order to participate in the fighting against the Ottomans despite their alignment with the Ottoman Empire before joining the revolt.
This in turn means that the Jordanian regime is now detested not only by the Palestinians but also by the Bedouins, who have called for a constitutional monarchy in which the king hands his powers to them. Should the tribes fail to achieve their goals, they will most likely expand their demonstrations of unrest—complete with tribal killings, blockades, armed fights, robberies, and attacks on police officers—which the Jordanian state finds itself having to confront weekly. In 2010, an average of five citizens was killed each week just as a result of tribal unrest.
The Hashemite regime cannot afford to confront the tribesmen since they constitute the regime's own servicemen and intelligence officers. In 2002, the Jordanian army besieged the southern Bedouin city of Ma'an in order to arrest a group of extremists, who were then pardoned a few years later. Similarly, Hammam Balaoui, a Jordanian intelligence double agent was arrested in 2006 for supporting al-Qaeda, only to be released shortly thereafter, eventually blowing himself up in Afghanistan in 2009 along with seven senior CIA officers and King Abdullah's cousin.
These open displays of animosity are of a piece with the Hashemite regime's use of its Palestinian citizens as pawns in its game of anti-Israel one-upmanship.
King Hussein—unlike his peace-loving image—made peace with Israel only because he could no longer afford to go to war against it. His son has been less shy about his hostility and is not reluctant to bloody Israel in a cost-effective manner. For example, on August 3, 2004, he went on al-Arabiya television and slandered the Palestinian Authority for "its willingness to give up more Palestinian land in exchange for peace with Israel." He often unilaterally upped Palestinian demands on their behalf whenever the Palestinian Authority was about to make a concession, going as far as to threaten Israel with a war "unless all settlement activities cease."
This hostility toward Israel was also evident when, in 2008, Abdullah started revoking the citizenship of Jordanian Palestinians. By turning the Palestinian majority in Jordan into "stateless refugees" and aggressively pushing the so-called "right of return," the king hopes to strengthen his anti-Israel credentials with the increasingly Islamist Bedouins and to embarrass Jerusalem on the world stage. It is not inconceivable to envision a scenario where thousands of disenfranchised Palestinians find themselves stranded at the Israeli border, unable to enter or remain in Jordan. The international media—no friend of the Jewish state—would immediately jump into action, demonizing Israel and turning the scene into a fiasco meant to burden Jerusalem's conscience—and that of the West. The Hashemite regime would thereby come out triumphant, turning its own problem—being rejected and hated by the Palestinians—into Israel's problem.
A Pot Boiling Over
The Jordanian government's mistreatment of its Palestinian citizenry has taken a significant toll. Today, the Palestinians are a ticking bomb waiting to explode, especially as they watch their fellow Arabs rebelling against autocrats such as Egypt's Mubarak, Libya's Qaddafi, or Syria's Assad.
The complex relationship between the Palestinian majority and the Hashemite minority seems to have become tenser since Abdullah ascended the throne in 1999 after King Hussein's death. Abdullah's thin knowledge of the Arabic language, the region, and internal affairs, made him dependent on the Bedouin-dominated Jordanian Intelligence Department standing firmly between the king and his people, of which the Palestinians are the majority. A U.S. embassy cable, dated July 2009, reported "bullying" practiced by the fans of al-Faisali Soccer Club (predominantly Bedouin Jordanians) against the fans of al-Wihdat Soccer Club (predominantly Palestinians), with al-Faisali fans chanting anti-Palestinian slogans and going so far as to insult Queen Rania, who is of Palestinian descent. Two days after the cable was released, Jordanian police mercilessly attacked Palestinian soccer fans without provocation, right under the eyes of the international media.
Palestinians in Jordan have also developed an intense hatred of the military as they are not allowed to join the army; they see Bedouin servicemen getting advantages in state education and health care, home taxes, and even tariff exemption on luxury vehicles. In recent years, the Jordanian military has consumed up to 20.2 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP).
Government spending does not end with the army. Jordan has one of the largest security and intelligence apparatuses in the Middle East, perhaps the largest compared to the size of its population. Since intelligence and security officers are labeled as "military servicemen" by the Jordanian Ministry of Finance, and their expense is considered military expenditure, Jordanian Palestinians see their tax dollars going to support job creation for posts from which they themselves are banned. At the same time, the country has not engaged in any warfare since 1970, leading some to conclude that this military spending is designed to protect the regime and not the country—a conclusion underscored by the Black September events.
A Path to Peace?
The desperate and destabilizing measures undertaken by the Hashemite regime to maintain its hold on power point to a need to revive the long-ignored solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict: the Jordanian option. With Jordan home to the largest percentage of Palestinians in the world, it is a more logical location for establishing Palestinian statehood than on another country's soil, i.e., Israel's.
There is, in fact, almost nothing un-Palestinian about Jordan except for the royal family. Despite decades of official imposition of a Bedouin image on the country, and even Bedouin accents on state television, the Palestinian identity is still the most dominant—to the point where the Jordanian capital, Amman, is the largest and most populated, Palestinian city anywhere. Palestinians view it as a symbol of their economic success and ability to excel. Moreover, empowering a Palestinian statehood for Jordan has a well-founded and legally accepted grounding: The minute the minimum level of democracy is applied to Jordan, the Palestinian majority would, by right, take over the political momentum.
For decades, however, regional players have entertained fears about empowering the Palestinians of Jordan. While there may be apprehension that Jordan as a Palestinian state would be hostile to Israel and would support terror attacks across their long border, such concerns, while legitimate, are puzzling. Israel has allowed the Palestinians to establish their own ruling entities as well as their own police and paramilitary forces on soil captured in the 1967 war, cheek by jowl with major Israeli population centers. Would a Palestinian state on the other side of the Jordan River pose any greater security threat to Israel than one in Judea and Samaria?
Moreover, the Jordan Valley serves as a much more effective, natural barrier between Jordan and Israel than any fences or walls. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed the centrality of Israeli control over the western side of the Jordan Valley, which he said would never be relinquished. It is likely that the area's tough terrain together with Israel's military prowess have prevented the Hashemite regime from even considering war with Israel for more than forty years.
It could be argued that should the Palestinians control Jordan, they would downsize the military institutions, which are dominated by their Bedouin rivals. A Palestinian-ruled Amman might also seek to cut back on the current scale of military expenditures in the hope that the U.S. military presence in the region would protect the country from unwelcome encroachments by Damascus or Tehran. It could also greatly benefit from financial and economic incentives attending good-neighbor relations with Israel. Even if a Jordanian army under Palestinian commanders were to be kept at its current level, it would still be well below Israel's military and technological edge. After all, it is Israel's military superiority, rather than regional goodwill, that drove some Arab states to make peace with it.
The Palestinians in Jordan already depend on Israel for water and have enjoyed a thriving economic boom driven by the "Qualified Industrial Zones," which allow for Jordanian clothing factories to export apparel to the United States at preferred tariff rates if a minimum percentage of the raw material comes from Israel. Hundreds of Palestinian factory owners have prospered because of these zones. Expanding such cooperation between a future Palestinian state in Jordan and Israel would give the Palestinians even more reasons to maintain a good relationship with their neighbor.
Both the United States and Israel should consider reevaluating the Jordan option. Given the unpopularity of the Hashemite regime among its subjects, regime change in Amman should not be that difficult to achieve though active external intervention would likely yield better results than the wait-and-see-who-comes-to-power approach followed during the Egyptian revolution. After twelve years on the throne, and $7 billion dollars in U.S. aid, Abdullah is still running a leaky ship and creating obstacles to resolving the Palestinian issue.
Washington's leverage can come into play as well with the Jordanian armed forces which are, in theory, loyal to the king. With hundreds of troops undergoing training in the United States each year and almost $350 million handed out in military aid, the U.S. establishment could potentially influence their choices.
Recent events in the Middle East should serve as guidelines for what ought to be pursued and avoided. U.S. diplomacy failed to nurse a moderate opposition to Egypt's Mubarak, which could have blocked Islamists and anti-Americans from coming to power. The current turmoil in Libya has shown that the later the international community acts, the more complicated the situation can get. An intervention in Jordan could be much softer than in Libya and with no need for major action. Abdullah is an outsider ruling a poor country with few resources; his only "backbone" is Washington's political and financial support. In exchange for a promise of immunity, the king could be convinced to let the Palestinian majority rule and become a figurehead, like Britain's Queen Elizabeth.
As further assurance of a future Palestinian Jordan's peaceful intentions, very strict antiterrorism laws must be implemented, barring anyone who has incited violence from running for office, thus ruling out the Islamists even before they had a chance to start. Such an act should be rewarded with economic aid that actually filters down to the average Jordanian as opposed to the current situation, in which U.S. aid money seems to support mainly the Hashemites' lavish lifestyle.
Alongside downsizing the military, a defense agreement with Washington could be put in place to help protect the country against potentially hostile neighbors. Those who argue that Jordan needs a strong military to counter threats from abroad need only look again at its history: In 1970, when Syria invaded northern Jordan, King Hussein asked for U.S. and Israeli protection and was eventually saved by the Israeli air force, which managed to scare the Syrian troops back across the border. Again in 2003, when Washington toppled Saddam Hussein, Amman asked for U.S.-operated Patriot missile batteries and currently favors an extended U.S. presence in Iraq as a Jordanian security need.
Should the international community see an advantage to maintaining the military power of the new Palestinian state in Jordan as it is today, the inviolability of the peace treaty with Israel must be reasserted, indeed upgraded, extending into more practical and tangible economic and political arenas. A mutual defense and counterterrorism agreement with Israel should be struck, based on one simple concept—"good fences make good neighbors"—with the river Jordan as the fence.
Considering the Palestinian-Jordanian option for peace would not pose any discrimination against Palestinians living in the West Bank, nor would it compromise their human rights: They would be welcome to move to Jordan or stay where they are if they so wished. Free will should be the determinant, not political pressure. Besides, there are indications that many would not mind living in Jordan. Were the Palestinians to dominate Jordan, this tendency will be significantly strengthened. This possibility has also recently been confirmed by a released cable from the U.S. embassy in Amman in which Palestinian political and community representatives in Jordan made clear that they would not consider the "right of return" should they secure their civil rights in Jordan.
Empowering Palestinian control of Jordan and giving Palestinians all over the world a place they can call home could not only defuse the population and demographic problem for Palestinians in Judea and Samaria but would also solve the much more complicated issue of the "right of return" for Palestinians in other Arab countries. Approximately a million Palestinian refugees and their descendents live in Syria and Lebanon, with another 300,000 in Jordan whom the Hashemite government still refuses to accept as citizens. How much better could their future look if there were a welcoming Palestinian Jordan?
The Jordanian option seems the best possible and most viable solution to date. Decades of peace talks and billions of dollars invested by the international community have only brought more pain and suffering for both Palestinians and Israelis—alongside prosperity and wealth for the Hashemites and their cronies.
It is time for the international community to adopt a more logical and less costly solution rather than to persist in long discredited misconceptions. It is historically perplexing that the world should be reluctant to ask the Hashemites to leave Jordan, a country to which they are alien, while at the same time demanding that Israeli families be removed by force from decades-old communities in their ancestral homeland. Equally frustrating is the world's silence while Palestinians seeking refuge from fighting in Iraq are locked in desert camps in eastern Jordan because the regime refuses to settle them "unless foreign aid is provided."
The question that needs to be answered at this point is: Has the West ever attempted to establish any contacts with a pro-peace, Palestinian-Jordanian opposition? Palestinians today yearn for leaders. Washington is presented with a historical opportunity to support a potential Palestinian leadership that believes in a peace-based, two-state solution with the River Jordan as the separating border between the two countries. Such leadership does seem to exist. Last September, for example, local leaders in Jordanian refugee camps stopped Palestinian youth from participating in mass protests against the Israeli Embassy in Amman; as a result, barely 200 protesters showed up instead of thousands as in similar, previous protests. As for East Jerusalem, under Israel's 44-year rule, Muslims, Christians, and members of all other religions have been able to visit and practice their faith freely, just as billions of people from all over the world visit the Vatican or Muslim pilgrims flock to Mecca. Yet under the Hashemite occupation of the city, this was not done. Without claiming citizenship, Jerusalem would remain an open city to all who come to visit.
The Jordanian option is an overdue solution: A moderate, peaceful, economically thriving, Palestinian home in Jordan would allow both Israelis and Palestinians to see a true and lasting peace.
Mudar Zahran is a Jordanian-Palestinian writer who resides in the United Kingdom as a political refugee. He served as an economic specialist and assistant to the policy coordinator at the U.S. Embassy in Amman before moving to the U.K. in 2010.
"Palestinians" In America Funding Their Jihad Using The Ways They Know Best
From the Jerusalem Post:
Alleged Hezbollah, Hamas men in NY smuggling ring
By JPOST.COM STAFF 17/05/2013
New York law enforcement authorities bust cigarette-smuggling ring funneling funds to terrorist groups.
NEW YORK – An extraordinary multi-agency policing effort came to a climax on Thursday, as search warrants executed from New York to Virginia led to 16 arrests in connection with a cigarette smuggling ring that authorities believe is the work of Hamas and Hezbollah operatives.
The scheme, which took in at least $65 million, involved Palestinians smuggling up to 20,000 cartons of cigarettes per week from low-tax states, for illegal resale across state lines.
The cost in lost tax revenue to New York State alone is estimated at $80m., authorities said. Based on previous operations, investigators believe the proceeds were being channeled to the two Islamist terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip (Hamas) and Lebanon (Hezbollah).
“The proceeds from this alleged scheme can be used to fund a host of other criminal acts that threaten national security and public safety of Americans at home and abroad,” said James T. Hayes Jr., special agent in charge of Homeland Security Investigations in New York.
All members of the enterprise were Palestinians between the ages of 37 and 62, the New York Police Department said on Thursday.
Leading the group, the police said, were brothers Basel and Samir Ramadan, who lived in New York while running the operation.
The Ramadan brothers allegedly bought their cigarettes in bulk from a wholesaler in Virginia and stored their stockpile at a facility in Delaware. They expanded their operations by depositing more than $55m. from their illicit sales into small businesses in Maryland, according to the allegations, and the money they earned from those businesses was then used to buy more cigarettes in Virginia.
The question now facing federal investigators is where the proceeds went.
“The association of some of the suspects in this case [with Brooklyn Jewish teenager] Ari Halberstam’s killer, [terror mastermind] the Blind Sheikh [Omar Abdel-Rahman] and a top Hamas official concerns us,” New York police commissioner Ray Kelly said. “While it hasn’t been established yet where the illicit proceeds ended up, we’re concerned because similar schemes have been used in the past to help fund terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah.”
While sources say that investigators are "following the money," the US doesn't expect foreign intelligence or law enforcement agencies to cooperate such that they will have sufficient evidence against the perpetrators to charge them with committing or conspiring to commit acts of terrorism.
In 1995, Operation Smokescreen busted a similar operation that US authorities believe topped $8m. in illicit revenue for Hezbollah. The operation involved numerous local and federal agencies, including the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service, the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and the FBI.
All cigarette packs sold in New York City must bear a joint New York City and New York State tax stamp, and only licensed stamping agents are authorized to possess untaxed cigarettes and use such a stamp.
Agencies involved in the latest operation apparently used electronic and physical surveillance methods to track down the crime ring.
The Atmospherics Of Islam - Conspiracy Theories, Aggression, Violence -- Explain The Syrian Outcome
From The New York Times:
Syria Begins to Break Apart Under Pressure From War
By BEN HUBBARD
CAIRO — The black flag of jihad flies over much of northern Syria. In the center of the country, pro-government militias and Hezbollah fighters battle those who threaten their communities. In the northeast, the Kurds have effectively carved out an autonomous zone.
After more than two years of conflict, Syria is breaking up. A constellation of armed groups battling to advance their own agendas are effectively creating the outlines of separate armed fiefs. As the war expands in scope and brutality, its biggest casualty appears to be the integrity of the Syrian state.
On Thursday, President Obama met in Washington with the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and once again pressed the idea of a top-down diplomatic solution. That approach depends on the rebels and the government agreeing to meet at a peace conference that was announced last week by the United States and Russia.
“We’re going to keep increasing the pressure on the Assad regime and working with the Syrian opposition,” Mr. Obama said. “We are going to keep working for a Syria that is free of Assad’s tyranny.”
But as evidence of massacres and chemical weapons mounts, experts and Syrians themselves say the American focus on change at the top ignores the deep fractures the war has caused in Syrian society. Increasingly, it appears Syria is so badly shattered that no single authority is likely to be able to pull it back together any time soon.
Instead, three Syrias are emerging: one loyal to the government, to Iran and to Hezbollah; one dominated by Kurds with links to Kurdish separatists in Turkey and Iraq; and one with a Sunni majority that is heavily influenced by Islamists and jihadis.
“It is not that Syria is melting down — it has melted down,” said Andrew J. Tabler, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and author of “In the Lion’s Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington’s Battle with Syria.”
“So much has changed between the different parties that I can’t imagine it all going back into one piece,” Mr. Tabler said.
Fueling the country’s breakup are the growing brutality of fighters on all sides and the increasingly sectarian nature of the violence.
Recent examples abound. Pro-government militias have hit coastal communities, targeting Sunni Muslim civilians. Sunni rebel groups have attacked religious shrines of other sects. A video circulating this week showed a rebel commander in Homs cutting out an enemy’s heart and liver, and biting into the heart.
Analysts say this shift in the nature of the violence will have a greater effect on the country’s future than territorial gains on either side by making it less likely that the myriad ethnic and religious groups that have long called Syria home will go back to living side by side. As the momentum seesaws back and forth between rebels and the government, the geographic divisions are hardening.
After steadily losing territory to rebels during the first two years of the conflict, government forces have progressed on a number of key fronts in recent weeks, routing rebel forces in the southern province of Dara’a, outside Damascus and in the central city of Homs and its surrounding villages.
These victories not only reflect strategic shifts by government forces but also could further solidify the country’s divisions.
Since mass defections of mostly conscripted soldiers shrank the government’s forces earlier in the uprising, it has largely given up on trying to reclaim parts of the country far from the capital, said Joseph Holliday, a fellow with the Institute for the Study of War in Washington.
Instead, the government has focused on solidifying its grip on a strip of land that extends from the capital, Damascus, in the south, up to Homs in the country’s center and west to the coastal area heavily populated by Mr. Assad’s sect, the Alawites.
Other than hitting them with airstrikes or artillery, Mr. Assad has made little effort to reclaim rebel-held areas in the country’s far north and east.
The character of those fighting for Mr. Assad has changed, too. As the uncommitted defected, the loyalists remained. “All of these defections and desertions basically created a more loyal and therefore more deployable core,” said Emile Hokayem, an analyst with the International Institute for Strategic Studies, who is based in Dubai. “At least you know who is fighting for you.”
Mr. Assad has also come to rely more heavily on paramilitary militias that draw largely from his Alawite sect and other minorities who consider him a bulwark against the rebels’ Islamism. More recently, fighters from Lebanon’s Shiite militant group Hezbollah have added extra muscle, especially in the border region near the town of Qusair, an area dotted with Shiite and Sunni villages that has seen intense fighting in recent months.
This new focus on tightening his grip on the country’s center suits Mr. Assad fine, said Abdulrahim Mourad, a Lebanese politician and former Parliament member who visited Mr. Assad in Damascus last month.
“He told jokes, was very funny,” Mr. Mourad said. “He was very relaxed and relieved.”
In the void left by the government in the country’s north and east, rebel groups have seized swaths of territory and struggled to establish local administrations.
Although the Obama administration and its allies share the rebels’ goal of removing Mr. Assad from power, they have little else in common with the many rebel brigades that define their struggle in Islamic terms and seek to replace Mr. Assad with an Islamic state. Among them is Jabhet al-Nusra, or the Nusra Front, the local branch of Al Qaeda, which the United States has blacklisted as a terrorist group.
The war’s duration and the competition for resources have left the rebel movement itself deeply fractured. Few effective links exist between the rebels’ exile leader, Gen. Salim Idris, and the most powerful groups on the ground.
And recent months have seen increasing fights among rebels, diminishing their ability to form a united front against the government. This week, the Islamist Shariah Commission in Aleppo went after rebels accused of looting. The council sent fighters to surround the group’s headquarters and arrested some of its members, confiscating trucks full of looted goods. The haul in one neighborhood included five washing machines and a television.
Another video, circulated this week, showed a Nusra Front leader in eastern Syria standing behind 11 bound and blindfolded captives. After announcing that they had been sentenced by an Islamic court for killing Syrians, he drew a pistol and shot them in the back of the head, one by one.
Activists later identified the man as a Saudi citizen named Qaswara al-Jizrawi. They also determined that the executions took place months earlier since Mr. Jizrawi was killed in March in a gunfight between his and another rebel group that left dozens of people dead on both sides.
In Syria’s northeastern Hassakeh Province, the country’s largest Kurdish majority area, residents have taken in Kurds fleeing violence elsewhere, expanded the teaching of the Kurdish language in schools and raised militias that have clashed with rebel brigades. Many local Kurds are linked to groups in Turkey and Iraq and hope to use the uprising to push for greater autonomy.
These spreading fissures leave little optimism that Syria can be stitched back together under one leadership in the near future.
“The only real outcome I see in the next 5 to 10 years is a series of cantons that agree to tactical cease-fires because they are tired of the bloodletting,” said Mr. Holliday, the analyst with the Institute for the Study of War. “That trajectory is in place, with or without Assad.”
IF you ask someone who is in favour of "the European project" what that project actually is, he will not reply: "The creation of a large and powerful unitary state without any unnecessary interference from populations that, because of their ignorance and stupidity, see no need for it" - a reply that at least would have the merit of honesty.
No: he will start mumbling about peace and the need to avoid a repetition of World War II, as if, were it not for directives from Brussels about how large bananas must be or what are the permitted scents in soap, Europeans would once again be at each other's throats.
Actually, a forced European unity, conjured from no popular sentiment by a strange combination of bureaucratic mediocrity and gaseous utopianism, is more likely to lead to conflict than to prevent it; and the increasingly wide divergence of the interests of France and Germany is fast recalling the ghosts of the past. The French fear to be dominated; the Germans don't want to be condescended to.
Relations between the two countries, often called (between them) the locomotive of Europe, have deteriorated since the arrival in power of Francois Hollande, who was elected on the promise of doing precisely the opposite of what the Germans think the French ought to do. Hollande was hoping for an alliance with Italy and the German Social Democrats if they returned to power; but the German Social Democrats are closer in policy to Angela Merkel than they are to Hollande (indeed, they are the authors of the very policies Hollande was elected to resist); and Italy can hardly help itself at the moment, let alone France. Hollande wanted to go for a grand slam when Germany held all the cards.
Two or three rather foolish recent statements have made matters worse. Hollande called for a state of "friendly tension" between the two countries, as if the differences between them were merely academic or a matter of cafe discussion, rather than of fundamental national interest.
Germany wants austerity in countries with large deficits and the generous social protections that make their labour and products uncompetitive; France wants increased government spending to avoid the reduction in public sector employment, wages and social protections that inevitably would be brought about by liberalisation of the labour market.
Unfortunately, thanks to the currency union (to which, incidentally, the population of neither country consented), French wishes can be met by one of only two methods: either the Germans pay for the deficits of other countries or accept a high rate of inflation. Neither appeals to them very much.
The president of the French National Assembly, Claude Bartolone, recently called for a "confrontation" with Germany over this matter. In his blog, Bartolone said that he had used the word in its old French sense, a comparison of two points of view; but the word is now used much more in its English sense - that is to say, of a conflict or clash, and the second is what he was taken to mean (and what I suspect he did mean).
Then a document produced by the leaders of Hollande's Socialist Party referred to Merkel's "intransigent egoism" that considered only "Berlin's trade surplus and her own electoral prospects".
(In the minds of most of the European political class, electorates are just a bloody nuisance, getting in the way of proper policy. That is why the class is so attached to European institutions, in which powerful apparatchiks who know best can take no notice of the dummy parliament and do not have to face the humiliating ritual of elections.)
A close adviser of Hollande regretted the wording of the document, saying that "it was all regrettable, disagreeable, inopportune", but also that it was not very serious.
What he did not do was to repudiate its fundamental meaning.
However maladroit its wording, and however much such maladroitness is a sign of political incompetence, the document pointed to a conflict of interests that was far from purely verbal. Hollande was elected on a program that could not but have brought him into conflict with Germany, even a Germany governed by the Social Democrats. But without the monetary union, there would have been no such possible conflict: Hollande could have followed his own policy (albeit at the cost of constant devaluation and the eventual impoverishment of his country) without bothering Germany.
Thus the overweening ambition of the European political class has resuscitated conflict between old enemies where none need have existed.
This is not to say that either the French or the German political elites have fallen out of love with the European project, far from it. The sole question is Humpty Dumpty's - which is to be master, that's all? Unfortunately, it has proved rather a dangerous one in Europe down the ages.
Libyan Writer Mojahed Busify On Muslims In Europe, The Jizyah, And His Fond Hopes
He's a good guy, of course, but his analysis of what's wrong with Muslims in Europe -- those buffoonish imams from villages in Dar al-islam who arrive to see real islam done -- makes him overlook, as he must, the essential nature of Islam, as expressed, and as immutable and unexpungeable, in Qur'an, Hadith, and Sira. He sees that the atttidue of Muslims in Europe is a problem, but cannot allow himself to recognize, much less express publicly, its originws, its depth, its permanence. He helps Infidels by telling them something that they need to know -- the Muslims live in Europe mostly on benefits, benefits pocketed as their right, their jizyah. That point has to be repeatedly made, and its good to have a reflective and critical (and therefore dissident or bad) Muslim make it -- Europeans are more likely to heed him, not fellow Europeans.
So here's his appearance, good up to a point, a point he just can't go beyond, for if he did, he'd be an apostate, and that he is, as yet, unwilling to be. .
As police searched for him, and as he lay bleeding in his boat hideout, Boston Marathon bombing suspect Dzhokhar Tsarnaev wrote "F*** America" on the side panel of the boat, police in Massachusetts told ABC News.
Officers said they also discovered the phrase "Praise Allah" on the boat's side panels and several anti-American screeds, including references to Iraq, Afghanistan and "the infidels."
A Massachusetts official showed ABC News what he said was a cell phone picture of the phrase "Praise Allah," written in black ink, with a bullet hole above it, believed to have been written by Dzhokhar as he hid inside the boat in Watertown, Mass.
Also seen in the picture was the faintly written word "brother," which the official said was part of a reference by the younger Tsarnaev "that was something about his brother is lucky to be with Allah first."
Tamerlan Tsarnaev was killed hours earlier during a shootout with police several blocks away from the location of the boat.
Spokespeople for the Massachusetts State Police and the Watertown police had denied the existence of the writings when first asked about them by ABC News two weeks ago.
Today, both departments referred reporters to the FBI. A federal law enforcement official confirmed reports first broadcast by CBS News that writings had been discovered inside the boat.
The discovery of writings intensified tensions between the FBI and local police when FBI agents believed some Boston officers and state police had taken cell phone pictures of the writing.
Agents demanded the phones of all officers at the scene the night of the capture of Dzhokhar be confiscated to avoid the photos becoming public before being used as evidence at trial, according to two law enforcement officials.
A FBI spokesperson said agents cannot confiscate phones without a warrant and officials said none of the police approached would agree to turn over their phones to the FBI.
Dhzokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev are accused of setting off a pair of bombs near the finish line of the Boston Marathon April 15, killing three people, including an eight-year-old boy, and injuring more than 260 others. Tamerlan was killed in a shootout with police days after the attack, while Dhzokhar was wounded and later captured in the boat.
The Oxford sex ring and the preachers who teach young Muslim men that white girls are cheap
Dr Taj Hargey is valiantly persevering with the faith of his ancestors hoping that he and a few others can bring about some sort of reformation from within. For his pains he has been threatened, abused and deemed an apostate and heretic. He has the courage to identify that these men are Muslims and that they comitted their crimes by following the teachings of their mosques. According to the Guardian they attended the Central Oxford Mosque in Manzil Way off Cowley Road, where they were well known.
The terrible story of the Oxford child sex ring has brought shame not only on the city of dreaming spires, but also on the local Muslim community. It is a sense of repulsion and outrage that I feel particularly strongly, working as a Muslim leader and Imam in this neighbourhood and trying to promote genuine cultural integration.
In its harrowing details, this grim saga of exploitation, misogyny, perversion and cruelty fills me not only with desperate sorrow for those girls and their families, but also with dread and despair.
If I were the judge in this case, I would hand out the harshest possible jail sentences to these monstrous predators, both to see that justice is done for their victims and to send out a message to other exploiters. And when I say harsh, I mean it: none of this fashionable nonsense about prisoners being released only a quarter of the way through their sentences. There is no pattern of good conduct these men could follow behind bars that could possibly make up for all the terrible suffering they have inflicted on others.
But apart from its sheer depravity, what also depresses me about this case is the widespread refusal to face up to its hard realities.
The fact is that the vicious activities of the Oxford ring are bound up with religion and race: religion, because all the perpetrators, though they had different nationalities, were Muslim; and race, because they deliberately targeted vulnerable white girls, whom they appeared to regard as ‘easy meat’, to use one of their revealing, racist phrases.
Indeed, one of the victims who bravely gave evidence in court told a newspaper afterwards that ‘the men exclusively wanted white girls to abuse’
But as so often in fearful, politically correct modern Britain, there is a craven unwillingness to face up to this reality. Commentators and poli-ticians tip-toe around it, hiding behind weasel words. We are told that child sex abuse happens ‘in all communities’, that white men are really far more likely to be abusers, as has been shown by the fall-out from the Jimmy Savile case.
But all this is deluded nonsense. While it is, of course, true that abuse happens in all communities, no amount of obfuscation can hide the pattern that has been exposed in a series of recent chilling scandals, from Rochdale to Oxford, and Telford to Derby.
In all these incidents, the abusers were Muslim men, and their targets were under-age white girls.
Moreover, reputable studies show that around 26 per cent of those involved in grooming and exploitation rings are Muslims, which is around five times higher than the proportion of Muslims in the adult male population. To pretend that this is not an issue for the Islamic community is to fall into a state of ideological denial.
But then part of the reason this scandal happened at all is precisely because of such politically correct thinking. All the agencies of the state, including the police, the social services and the care system, seemed eager to ignore the sickening exploitation that was happening before their eyes. Terrified of accusations of racism, desperate not to undermine the official creed of cultural diversity, they took no action against obvious abuse.
Amazingly, the predators seem to have been allowed by local authority managers to come and go from care homes, picking their targets to ply them with drink and drugs before abusing them. You can be sure that if the situation had been reversed, with gangs of tough, young white men preying on vulnerable Muslim girls, the state’s agencies would have acted with greater alacrity.
Another sign of the cowardly approach to these horrors is the constant reference to the criminals as ‘Asians’ rather than as ‘Muslims’.
In this context, Asian is a completely meaningless term. The men were not from China, or India or Sri Lanka or even Bangladesh. They were all from either Pakistan or Eritrea, which is, in fact, in East Africa rather than Asia. What united them in their outlook was their twisted, corrupt mindset, which bred their misogyny and racism.
In the misguided orthodoxy that now prevails in many mosques, including several of those in Oxford, men are unfortunately taught that women are second-class citizens, little more than chattels or possessions over whom they have absolute authority. That is why we see this growing, reprehensible fashion for segregation at Islamic events on university campuses, with female Muslim students pushed to the back of lecture halls.
There was a telling incident in the trial when it was revealed that one of the thugs heated up some metal to brand a girl, as if she were a cow. ‘Now, if you have sex with someone else, he’ll know that you belong to me,’ said this criminal, highlighting an attitude where women are seen as nothing more than personal property.
The view of some Islamic preachers towards white women can be appalling. They encourage their followers to believe that these women are habitually promiscuous, decadent and sleazy — sins which are made all the worse by the fact that they are kaffurs or non-believers. On one level, most imams in the UK are simply using their puritanical sermons to promote the wearing of the hijab and even the burka among their female adherents. But the dire result can be the brutish misogyny we see in the Oxford sex ring.
For those of us who support effective and meaningful integration, it is dispiriting to see how little these criminals, several of them second-generation Britons, have been integrated into our society. Instead, they saw only people from an alien world with which they felt no connection. For them, there was no sense of kinship or solidarity for people in their neighbourhood who were not Muslims.
It is telling, though, that they never dared to target Muslim girls from the Oxford area. They knew that they would be sought out by the girls’ families and ostracised by their community. But preying on vulnerable white girls had no such consequences — once again revealing how intimately race and religion are bound up with this case.
Horror over this latest scandal should serve as a catalyst for a new approach, but change can take place only if we abandon the dangerous blinkers of political correctness and antiquated multiculturalism.
[A] few optimistic observers suggest that we create a distinction between a category of ‘moderate’ Islamic countries, and a separate category of ‘hardline’ ones.
I’m sure this is a perfectly well-intentioned enterprise but for me at least, it has too many flaws to be taken seriously.
For a start, what exactly are we to mean by the word ‘moderate’? Are we suggesting that the Muslims of such places do not take the threat of hellfire or the promise of paradise as seriously as in others? Surely not.
I think what people really intend by this phrase, is ‘more like us’.
By ‘moderate’ they mean countries in which there are as many cafes as there are mosques, and where European languages are spoken by the natives.
But surely the error in all this is clear.
No adaptation to Western secular culture makes for ‘moderation’ in religious culture. Secular culture (cafes, television, newspapers), fills spaces religion doesn’t fill. But the spaces religion does fill remain filled by the same religion as existed in the 7th century.
Think of it this way – There are millions of Muslims living with us right now in the West, many of whom speak fluently the languages of their adopted lands, and who spend hours each week not only in cafes, but in Tesco, ASDA and other places we might recognise too. They are, in this respect ‘like us’. They may even live next door to us… But as the 7/7 bombers showed, this is no guarantee against the most radical religious fervour and extreme behaviour developing in those internal spaces still occupied by their religion.
Since the 7/7 bombers were born and raised in a Western environment, and still emerged as terrorists, why should the presence of a few Western characteristics in North Africa or Anatolia reassure us that such places are themselves peopled by moderate Muslims?
Islam of the most extreme variety can co-exist (or co-develop) quite smoothly with some aspects of modernity, but only up to a point. At such a point radical Islam feels compelled to demonstrate a moral supremacy over it. The perceived moral laxity of the modern world acts as fuel to the Islamist fire. Our freedom is a provocation.
Just the other week, one of the countries most often suggested as a beacon of moderation, Tunisia, saw an outbreak of Islamist violence as well as the assassination of an elected official. Another commonly suggested ‘moderate’ state, Turkey, has an Islamist government apparently determined to roll the clock back a century at a time. I seem to remember even Egypt being suggested as an example of Muslim modernity, just a few months before the ‘spring’ which set in motion the Muslim Brotherhood’s seizure of power.
Even if you call a spade a rake, it remains a spade. So let’s dispense with the lies.
From the French edition of The Local. A different form of 'grooming' so as to procure young girls.
French police have charged seven men with removing a child from her parents’ care, after a 15-year-old convert to Islam, whose father is British, left home after "marrying" a 28-year-old Muslim man “over the phone".
The charges were brought after an investigation by police in the eastern French town of Mulhouse into a shady online scheme which put Muslim men in contact with young girls, who are newly-converted to Islam. After being introduced, the men then ‘marry’ the young girls online and over the phone.
The scheme came to light earlier this month after a 15-year-old girl, whose father is British, ran away from home to live with an older Muslim man. The girl had recently converted to Islam, along with three girlfriends, aged 17, 18 and 19, without her Christian parents' knowledge after frequenting social network internet sites.
Her father informed local prosecutor Hervé Robin that his teenage daughter began wearing a burqa and voicing extreme Islamist views.
On May 6th, the girl’s father called police, alerting them to the fact that his daughter appeared to have run away. Using a signal from the 28-year-old suspect’s mobile phone, police were able to geolocate him in Valence, 500km away in the Drome department of central France, along with his new teenage ‘wife.’
The girl, who told investigators this was her second marriage, after being denounced and rejected by her first husband, has since returned home to live with her parents in Mulhouse, while prosecutors carry out their investigation.
Her ‘husband’, himself a convert to Islam, has been remanded in custody in Mulhouse, a town 100 km from Strasbourg and next to the Swiss border. Among the seven being held is a man from Moulins, central France, who is suspected of being the ringleader of the scheme.