by Lev Tsitrin
The war on Hamas only started, but Israel’s security failures that triggered it are already under close scrutiny. Foreign Affairs published a piece revealingly titled “Israel’s Intelligence Disaster” that is focused more on asking questions than on giving answers; the New York Times provided, in harrowing detail, those very answers in its “How Israel’s Feared Security Services Failed to Stop Hamas’s Attack:” over-reliance on modern technology — remote cameras to monitor the border fence and remotely-controlled machine guns to deal with incursions, both rendered useless when Hamas destroyed them, along with cellular towers that provided communications, using armed drones, thus blinding the remote defenders of the fence and allowing the fence itself to be destroyed without anyone noticing; concentration of Israeli command-and-control in a single base which got overrun, senior commanders killed or taken captive, thus leaving the overall army command unaware of what has transpired, and allowing Palestinian terrorists to go on their frightful rampage.
When the dust finally settles and commissions of inquiry will start looking into this debacle, there will likely be more blame to spread around. The political decision-makers will likely be found equally at fault: after all, it was a political decision to buy off Hamas with Israeli work permits for tens of thousands of Gaza workers so as to improve Gaza’s economy and make Gazans love their Hamas rulers, as well as letting Qatar pay salaries of Hamas functionaries (and giving Hamas the ability to rebuild its tunnel networks and replenish its rocket arsenal) — in the belief that Hamas has become a responsible governing party, having learned their lesson from the previous rounds of fighting, and preferring to avoid armed confrontation. No wonder the watchers of the border with Gaza relaxed, largely relegating their task to state-of-the-art technological wonders.
This raises the question: did October 7 result from intelligence failure — or from human misunderstanding? Was it the failure to detect the warning signs — or the absence of the need to look for those signs?
Consider the 2015 San Bernardino attack — in which “Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, a married couple living in the city of Redlands, targeted a San Bernardino County Department of Public Health training event and Christmas party of about 80 employees in a rented banquet room. 14 people were killed and 22 others were seriously injured.” Given that Farook was “a health inspector for the San Bernardino County Department of Public Health,” was this an “intelligence failure” on the part of his co-workers (or of the government)? Was a rampage by Major Hassan an “intelligence failure?” I don’t think so. Their colleagues did not understand that they were working with the monsters; that’s all. They felt no need to listen in, to gather intelligence. They expected a normal workplace relationship — and that was all there was to it. But so did the top Israeli political echelon with regards to Hamas: the relations were frosty, but there was a modus vivendi of live and let live.
Yet, Hamas’ unexpected and brutal violation of that status quo revealed not only Israel’s fundamental misunderstanding of Hamas — but also, Hamas’ fundamental misunderstanding of Israel — which is why, for all its brilliant planning and execution, the October 7 attack will wind up as a colossal strategic failure for Hamas, likely leading to its demise. Hamas’ calculus was simple: on the one hand, killing all Israelis in sight, and broadcasting the footage of the assault far and wide was supposed to instill fear, and make Israelis run for their lives in blind horror at their impending fate, thus “liberating Palestine.” On the other hand, the hostages served a dual purpose of human shields, preventing Israeli counter-strike — as well as to be used as bargaining chips for release of imprisoned Palestinian terrorists. Both assumptions were based on the prior Israeli behavior: after all, Israelis swapped some 1,200 terrorists for a single captive soldier, Gilad Shalit. It is no wonder that on October 9, Hamas triumphantly suggested a truce.
This showed a rather astonishing misunderstanding of Israel on the part of Hamas. Instead of tearfully supplicating on bent knee, Israelis girded themselves for a grim task of war — the task of eradicating Hamas as a military and political force. Their logic was ineluctable: Israel cannot live with such a neighbor. Hamas has to cease its existence — proving to Israelis themselves, and to its Arab and Moslem neighbors, both hostile and friendly, that Israel is firmly planted in the Middle East, and will not be dislodged.
It is truly a mystery how Hamas leadership failed to understand this basic Israeli mindset. One would think that after living side-by-side with Israelis for their entire lives, they would have learned at least something about their Israeli enemy. It seems that Hamas even misjudged their closest friend — Lebanon’s Hezbollah which, contrary to Hamas’ expectation that its stunningly successful attack in the South would unleash the fire from the North, did not so far open the second front. Of course, the Gerald R Ford battle group moving closer to the theater is one factor that cools hot heads — but another likely factor is, that those heads may not be particularly hot in the first place. Destruction of Israel is not Hezbollah’s only project, after all; keeping Assad in power is another one — as well as maintaining stability (and its badly-shaken dominance) in Lebanon itself. Syrian opposition salivates at the very prospect of Hezbollah-Israel war, since it will remove one of the main props of Assad regime from Syria. And toppling of Assad would be a gigantic blow to both Russia and Iran — the two powers that are vitally interested in keeping him in power. So some pretty big boys have key interest in Hezbollah staying put. And other, equally big boys — not just Israel, but Saudi Arabia and its allies have a strategic interest in Hamas being thoroughly beaten, and Israel emerging a victor.
Bottom line — Israel’s was a colossal failure that needs to be investigated, and its lessons learned and incorporated by Israel’s intelligence and the military. But so was Hamas’ — which put itself in existential danger in exchange of a momentary pleasure of going on a killing rampage. It is hard to predict the future, but Hamas’ fate will likely be that of Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, killed in a shootout with the police — or at best, that of Major Hassan, “paralyzed from the waist down from the bullet wounds to his spine, and [who] would likely never walk,” especially if Israelis decide that it is necessary for their security to establish a miles-wide, Israel-controlled buffer zone in Gaza’s south to prevent future smuggling for weaponry from Sinai.
Israel’s failure on October 7 was appalling — but it was a strategic miscalculation of Hamas, too. Hard as it seems at the moment, Israel will eventually overcome the pain caused by its errors. It is doubtful that the same can be said of Hamas.
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7 Responses
Thank you for this interesting article. Let us hope you are right and that the massive ground invasion everyone anticipates leads to the demise of Hamas without developing into a wider conflict. My concern is that Gaza is the bait to take Israel’s eye off the ball elsewhere. And it’s the ground invasion Hezbollah and Iran are waiting for.
Let’s get real.
* All of the captured and killed Hamas will be replaced with a new Hamas generation. See our debacles in Afghanistan, Vietnam.
* All the killed and captured Hamas have demonstrated their loyalty to their god and are, as desired, secure in a place in Paradise.
* Prepare for ‘Hamas’ attacks of varying intensity on all anniversaries of Islam defeats and victories [Mumbai slaughter of 15 years ago, synagogue and chuch slaughters] and non-Islam ‘holidays’ such as Thanksgiving, Christmas, 9/11, Memorial Day, V-E Day, V-J Day, …
* Terrorist ability to overcome civilian venues in Europe, S.A.,
and USA with multiple attackers (How many schools, religious facilities are guarded 24/7 by shielded 5+ awake defenders ?).
* Will Israel patrol Gaza tunnels and surface streets with feral dogs and feral pigs/boars at least until forever?
* Will we ever learn to play hardball or will we need more instruction from our enemies?
Lev Tsitrin writes like an American thinker (punt intended), not like a clever Jew should.
Three red flags.
1. Mr. Tsitrin writes about “a political decision to buy off Hamas with Israeli work permits.” Palestinians, like all people, want freedom and prosperity, not an enslaved living in Gaza sweetened by the job permits. One cannot buy people’s giving up their dignity.
2. “One would think that after living side-by-side with Israelis for their entire lives, they would have learned at least something about their Israeli enemy.” They did. They know that Israel does not want to return the houses and the land grabbed in the past. Their desperation brings to mind the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. Similar chances to win, similar desperation to regain at least some dignity in the hopeless situation.
3. “This showed a rather astonishing misunderstanding of Israel on the part of Hamas.” It is precisely the opposite; it is the misunderstanding of Palestinians by Jews. The peace will come when Jews see their neighbors as citizens of equal rights. Sadly, it is hard to do that with the brutality of atrocities. But Jews are in charge – richer and supposedly smarter. Only they have the power, means, and wisdom to do that. They lack the will.
1. They could have had freedom and prosperity long since.
In 1937 they could have had an embryonic territory in 3/4 of the mandate west of the Jordan, roughly the territorial dominance the Jews won in 1948 by fighting not to be driven out, just by accepting the Peel Plan. Sure, the Brits might not have left right away, it was 1937, but the Arabs would have been in the big chair when they did leave. Nope. War was better. Against the Jews AND the British. Which they lost. Of course.
In 1948 they could have had freedom and prosperity by accepting the UN plan, in about half the mandate, a reduction that was only fair given they had rejected the 1937 borders for spite and because [for reasons I understand just fine] they expected Germany to win the big war. Oops. Nope. War, with the backing of the whole Arab world, or to be fair at the instigation of the rest of the Arab world, was better, to get the whole country. Which they lost. Of course. The one “Arab-Israeli war” in which they should have been able to contend with the Jews on equal terms, plus they had the backing of a slew of Arab countries who should have been overwhelmingly superior, they lost. Or rather, they decided to sit it out and let the unfortunately useless Arab armies win for them. oops.
They could have had freedom and prosperity after that in the reduced, but now fairly the best case, claim of the West Bank and Gaza if they had asked Egypt and Jordan to make that state for them and either Arab power had been inclined to give it to them, which of course they were not, and why would they? But for reasons including pressure from those very powers, the now emergent “Palestinian” organizations never asked for that and instead kept on with the dream of having the whole territory, that they couldn’t win in 1937 or 1948.
They might have even had freedom and prosperity in late June 1967 if they had offered permanent peace for full statehood in the WB and G, bar East Jerusalem. Losing multiple wars has fair prices and that time no way was Israel giving up Jerusalem. They had just won back the city that was theirs first. If the Pals wanted East Jerusalem denied to Israel, they had that chance prior to 1967.
They could have freedom and prosperity even now, albeit under yet more straitened territorial and security conditions, at any time. Nothing is stopping them.
From the River to the Sea is as unrealistic as the dream of a German Oder or Niemen again, and as poorly founded in international law and refugee law. And the Arabs have shown their inability to make it real by the only way it could be made real. Besides, it still means, as it always meant, being rid of the Jews. Who aren’t leaving.
2. The Germans were always setting up to destroy the Warsaw Ghetto and kill its entire population. That was the whole point. The Israelis were not always setting up to exterminate the Palestinians of Gaza. They most likely don’t want to do that even now, though I would without batting an eyelid, in their place. Nor have they been trying to do that at any point. There is no comparability of “hopelessness”.
Please repeat with me. If you live in the Warsaw Ghetto in 1943 and do nothing, you are going to die and so is everyone else. This is the sole, known, inevitable consequence of being a Jew in the ghetto. You know this. Your neighbours have already been carted off to die. There is no question. You are not merely poor. You are not merely hungry. You are not merely unable to leave. You are marked for death, and in no long term either.
3. The Jews don’t have to see their Palestinian neighbours as citizens with equal rights. They DO have to see them as citizens of a free Palestinian nation that is their friendly neighbour. They have not always, and not all, been very interested in having such a neighbour. The Palestinians have never given the slightest sign of being interested in being such a neighbour. They’ve had over 80 years of trying to redress the mistakes of those who led their community before 1939.
Even now, every time there is a Palestinian protest in Ottawa at our “Human Rights Memorial”, I get a coffee at Starbucks and marinate in the chants of “From the River to the Sea.” I can never quite decide on whether it would be wiser to just teach them that if you are an all or nothing kind of guy and you can’t have it all, you will rightly get nothing, or to challenge them by saying, right, if that is your goal, form up as an army and fight for it openly, as though you were men.
Unlike some, I do not see a suicide bomber as a coward. Takes guts to kill yourself in pursuit of a cause. Though it’s a little more cowardly if the target is a shopping mall rather than a station full of armed cops. In this raid, any Hamas whose main role was to breach the wall, kill IDF, wreck cameras, or disable command posts, as engaged in more or less war. I do see men who attack a music festival of latter day hippie types to kill, rape torture and kidnap them, as cowards. Animals, really.
“The peace will come when Jews see their neighbors as citizens of equal rights.”
I think what you must mean is that the Jews must accept that the Palestinians have equal rights to kill them as they do to stay alive.
The invasion from the north has now started. Iran next?
Interesting examination of some of the defensive failures.
I admit I have no understanding of Israeli life. I DID wonder at having such a festival within such close proximity to Gaza.
It struck me as Gondor hosting a rave within sight of the Anduin river at Osgiliath.
It might be just me, but I’d have miles deep minefields behind that perimeter wall. And human patrols.