Why Did Netanyahu Go to Oman?

by Hugh Fitzgerald

Oman’s Sultan Qaboos (left) and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. (photo:AP)

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently returned from a surprise, secret, one-day trip to Oman, where he engaged in talks with Sultan Qaboos. The 70-year-old Qaboos has largely stayed out of the Middle Eastern conflicts. Oman never went to war with Israel, and it was one of only three Arab states not to break relations with Egypt after Sadat signed the Camp David Accords. Nor has it been involved in the Sunni-Shi’a conflict, for 75% of  Omanis belong to Ibadiyya Islam, a third branch of Islam, found only in Oman and in a handful of oases in Algeria. It is much too complicated to detail the theological differences and similarities of Ibadis with Sunni and Shi’a Muslims, but we ought to mention the political quietism of Ibadiyya Islam, and the comparatively good treatment that Ibadis have historically provided to Christians and Jews living amongst them. The Ibadi sect’s emphasis on tolerance and moderation is underscored by the accommodations that Oman’s leadership provides the 25 percent of the population that is not Ibadi. Unlike any other country — except Israel — in the region, Oman’s legal system offers extensive protection to religious minorities (Sunni and Shiite Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, Christians and Buddhists). Oman is, in its advocacy of religious pluralism and social inclusion, far ahead of its Arab neighbors. The Ibadis are a tiny minority in the world of Islam. 90% of Muslims are Sunnis, a little more than 9% are Shi’a, and fewer than 1% are Ibadis, so tolerance for both Sunnis and Shi’a in Oman is a way to ensure tolerance for Ibadis  outside of Oman..

Why did Netanyahu and Qaboos get together just now?

Many reports claim that the Israelis are using Oman as a back channel to Iran. For the Omanis maintain cordial relations with Iran, just as they do with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and every other state in the Gulf, and this may be a way for Israel to communicate with its archenemy.

The visit has come after months of negotiations between Israel and Oman. Could the timing of the visit to Oman also be related to the Khashoggi fiasco? No reports have mentioned this as a reason for Netanyahu’s visit to Muscat, but the Israeli leader has a stake in the political survival of the Saudi Crown Prince. Muhammad bin Salman has formed a tacit alliance with Israel against Iran, their shared mortal enemy. Furthermore, the Crown Prince has become friends with Jared Kushner, offering advice as the latter worked on his “peace plan” for Israelis and “Palestinians.” This plan, not yet revealed, is reputed to be far more favorable to the Israeli position — and has  the Crown Prince’s approval — than any previous peace proposals by administrations in Washington.

And what about Sultan Qaboos? He has been under great pressure from the Saudis to join their anti-Qatar coalition, which now consists of Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E,, Bahrain, and Egypt. The Saudis are opposed to Qatar both for its links with Iran and for its support of the Muslim Brotherhood, a group whom the Saudis regard with horror for its promotion of “Islamic democracy” that would mean the end of the Saudi and other Gulf monarchies. Sultan Qaboos prefers to remain neutral, and despite Saudi pressure has not joined the anti-Qatar coalition. Nor has he taken any position on the Sunni-Shi’a war right next door, in Yemen. On the other hand, he did back Saudi Arabia when that country cut off relations with Canada for “interfering” in its domestic affairs. When Saudis arrested several activists, including Samar Badawi, the sister of Raif Badawi, a prisoner of conscience, Chrystia Freeland, the Canadian foreign minister, tweeted about how appalled she was at news of these arrests, and the next day the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for the Saudis to “immediately release” those they had just arrested. The Saudis were furious. They expelled the Canadian ambassador, called back their own ambassador from Ottawa, cancelled contracts with Canada, and pulled thousands of Saudi students out of Canadian colleges and universities. Sultan Qaboos immediately took the Saudi side, declaring that Oman supported Riyadh’s view that nations should not interfere in the domestic affairs — i.e., arrests of human-rights activists — of other nations.

But Qaboos continues to remain aloof from the anti-Qatar coalition and, furthermore, continues to maintain friendly ties with Iran.

Though there were months of negotiations with Oman, could the timing of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s secret, one-day visit have been suggested to him by his friend the Crown Prince? Perhaps the visit, originally meant to serve as a backchannel to Iran, became something else. For during these months of preparation for the visit, Iran has shown no signs of curbing its proxy war against Saudi Arabia in Yemen. It has not halted, either, its attempts to acquire bases in Syria, and to supply Hezbollah with advanced weaponry, both meant for use against Israel. Perhaps establishing a “backchannel” was no longer plausible, given Iranian intransigence, and the visit became something quite different.

Perhaps the visit had a new purpose: for Netanyahu to fully apprise Sultan Qaboos of the continuing Iranian threat, and its possible consequences for Oman itself. Having been unable to persuade Sultan Qaboos to cut ties with either Iran or Qatar, the Crown Prince might have decided that the Israeli prime minister could help persuade Sultan Qaboos of Iran’s menace. Netanyahu could have brought with him information gathered by the Israelis — the head of Mossad came with him to Oman, about secret weapons factories in Lebanon, and Iran’s progress — far beyond what it had publicly declared — in its nuclear project, based on the 50,000 documents Israeli agents whisked out of their hiding place in Tehran this past summer.

He might have been able to convey to the Sultan the continuing Iranian threat, and have been received with better grace than the Crown Prince, for several reasons. First, the Omanis resent the pressure that the Saudis have put on them over the last few years, first about Oman’s refusal to cut ties with Iran, and then, over Oman’s refusal to join the anti-Qatar coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The Omanis don’t like the feeling of being bullied by the behemoth of the Gulf. The Crown Prince can be off-puttingly peremptory. Prime Minister Netanyahu, while impassioned on the subject of Iran, is no bully, and may have a better chance than did the Crown Prince to persuade Sultan Qaboos of the full menace posed by Iran.

Second, Netanyahu might be persuasive — where the Saudis might be seen as engaging in special pleading — in discussing the consequences of a possible Iranian victory in Yemen. Would the Iranians place bases there, as they are now trying to do in Syria? What would be the consequences of having Yemen as an outpost for the Iranian military, just to the southwest of Oman, for Oman itself? He might remind Sultan Qaboos that Iran has repeatedly threatened to block all oil traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, which if it were to be accomplished, or even just attempted, could lead to a larger conflagration in Oman’s vicinity. And the Omanis don’t like trouble; their whole policy has been to remain above the fray. But what if the fray comes to their neighborhood?

Third, Netanyahu might point to all the ways that disruption could be caused in Oman’s neighborhood by an Iranian-backed insurrection among the several million Shi’a in eastern Saudi Arabia. For those Shi’a have engaged in mass protests before against their Saudi masters, and might be inspired to open revolt by the example of a Shi’a victory in Yemen and the promise of military aid from Iran. The Shi’a happen to live where almost all of Saudi Arabia’s oil is produced, so Riyadh cannot possibly allow a separatist movement to succeed. The Saudis would attempt to suppress with their wonted brutality such a Shia revolt. While the Saudis are thus engaged, Iranians might find reasons to enter Oman “to help our Omani brothers” against possible Saudi invasion — that is, Iran would help itself to Oman. Oman’s population is only a few million; it could offer little resistance. Iran would then be able to control the flow of oil not just at the chokepoint of the Straits of Hormuz, but all the way down the Gulf to the Arabian Ocean. Iranian forces in Oman could link up with the Houthis in Yemen. This is not what will happen — Yemen is still up in the air — but what could plausibly happen, should Iran prevail in Yemen. Netanyahu may have discussed some, or none, or all of these possibilities, in his many hours of talks with Sultan Qaboos.

The Omani policy has always been to prevent, or stay well out of, conflict. Only once, in 1980, did Oman rashly agree to help Iraq bomb Iranian ships in the Gulf, a dangerous plan that the Americans talked the Omanis out of at the last minute. But Netanyahu, with the convincing force of his presentation — on view several times at the U.N. — might be able to persuade Sultan Qaboos to recognize the unique menace of Iran, and to recognize, too, that Oman, though it has not acted against Iran, is`still a potential victim of Iranian aggression because of its location. That should concentrate the Omani ruler’s mind, and could lead him, at long last, to join the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Egyptians, and the Israelis, in an anti-Iranian coalition of the willing. And that could even mean a pre-emptive stationing of Saudi, Emirati, and Egyptian troops in Oman, should Iran begin to get ideas.

Of course, this scenario only sets out what might be. But nor is it a wild surmise. The Israeli leader, reports insist, went to Muscat to discuss backchannel communications with Iran. Netanyahu would certainly like to help his friend the Crown Prince in his hour of need, and what better way than to provide him with a diplomatic coup, by persuading Sultan Qaboos to move away from his wonted neutrality, and forthrightly support the Saudis in their face-off with Iran?

Originally published in two parts at Jihad Watch here and here.